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THE EVOLUTION OF SHERMAN ACT JURISDICTION:
A ROADMAP FOR COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM
BruceJohnsen* & Moin A. Yahyt*
Choose your rut carefully; you'll be in it for a long time.'
INTRODUCTION
Scholars and jurists increasingly acknowledge that the U.S. Su-
preme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence desperately needs a
new direction. Even Laurence Tribe, widely regarded as a liberal
commentator, concedes that until very recently the Court's decisions
in this area came dangerously close to foreclosing it from imposing
any kind of principled constitutional limitation on the scope of
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.3 Chief Justice Rehnquist has openly
admitted that much of the case law in this area is less than a model of
clarity.4 In what has been heralded by some as the Rehnquist Court's
"celebrated project to re-establish structural constitutional principles
on federalism,' ' and by others more prosaically as "the new federal-
ism, ''6 recent Supreme Court cases have imposed Tenth Amendment
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2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the "power ... [tlo regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes").
1 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816 (3d ed. 2000).
4 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 exceeds Congress's authority to regulate commerce).
, Michael Greve, Collision Court: Upcoming Clash Between Federalism and Pre-emption is Foretold
in Geier v. American Honda Opinions, LEGAL TIMES, June 12, 2000, at 74.
6 See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States' Rights, the New Federalism, the New Commerce
Clause and the Proposed New Abdication, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 869 (2000) (distinguishing mod-
em day federalism from traditional federalism based on states' rights).
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constraints on federal commerce power,7 limited the local application
of federal regulatory statutes to Congress's unmistakable intent," and
most importantly found that local non-economic activities lie outside
the constitutional scope of Commerce Clause jurisdiction.9 Yet, in
spite of indications the Rehnquist Court is inclined to seek a new di-
rection, it remains to be seen how it might do so in a way that mini-
mizes troublesome conflicts with the existing body of constitutional
precedent. This Article shows that the Court can look to the evolu-
tion of Sherman Acto jurisdiction to realign its approach to Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction to restore the balance of dual sovereignty
while posing little immediate threat to constitutional precedent.
The first of two steps is for the Court to fully embrace competitive
federalism as the long-run framework within which to gradually nar-
row the evolving contours of Commerce Clause jurisdiction." Com-
petitive federalism has experienced growing appreciation among po-
litical scientists, economists, and constitutional scholars, 2 with some
7 E.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176-77 (1992) (holding that Congress can-
not compel states to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their
borders or to take title to the waste in the alternative).
s E.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)
(holding that the Clean Water Act could not be applied to an abandoned sand and gravel pit);
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000) (using statutory construction to conclude that
an owner-occupied residence does not qualify as property used in commerce).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that 42 U.S.C. §
13,981, which provides a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, goes be-
yond Congress's Commerce Clause authority); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68
(1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeds Congress's authority to
regulate commerce).
10 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
it Competitive federalism is also variously known as "the economics of federalism," Frank H.
Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26J.L. & ECON. 23, 28 (1983), and "market-
preserving federalism," Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 1 IJ.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 14 (1995).
12 See generally COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND
EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) (examining
interjurisdictional competition from economic, historical, and political science perspectives);
THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS xv (1990) (setting
forth a theory of competitive federalism: "the encouragement of rivalry among state and local
governments to offer citizen-taxpayers the best array of public services at the lowest costs");
James M. Buchanan & Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tie-
bout Mode4 IJ. PUB. ECON. 25 (1972) (providing a critical re-examination of the Tiebout model
for local goods provision, with an emphasis on efficiency limits); William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that there should be as
much federal interest in the conduct of the corporation itself as in the market for its securities);
Easterbrook, supra note 11 (arguing that competition among states may lead to better regula-
tion); William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Subur-
ban Communities, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 119 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E.
Oates eds., 1975) (extending the Tiebout model to include nonresidential land use); Wallace E.
Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Dis-
tortion Inducing, 35J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988) (examining the normative implications of compe-
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even suggesting it has been the driving force of sustained economic
development in modern times.1 3 There is no doubt the U.S. Constitu-
tion establishes a federal system, but this says nothing about what de-
termines the proper balance of dual sovereignty. Under competitive
federalism, state and federal governments compete with one another
to provide regulation to a mobile citizenry. State regulation under
local "police powers" is justified when economic markets fail to allo-
cate resources efficiently due to economic spillovers-so-called "ex-
ternalities"-that separate the parties who benefit from those who
bear costs of an activity. When confined to a single state, competition
from other states ensures that the state's regulators have sufficient in-
centive to address economic spillovers. In the face of interstate spill-
overs, however, individual states will misallocate political resources by
engaging in too little regulation of their internal economic markets.
Federal regulation of economic markets under the Commerce Clause
is justified only when competition between states leads to a political
market failure.
This approach has been criticized as a prescription for how the
Court should determine the limits of federal commerce power be-
cause those seeking regulation can always make a plausible claim that
the activity in question generates an interstate economic spillover,
while in fact they are motivated by private rent seeking. 4 Through-
tition among local jurisdictions to attract new industry and income); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabili-
tating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992) (arguing that federal regulation dealing with the race-
to-the-bottom is likely to produce undesirable results); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) (exploring state competition
from an empirical perspective); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDoZO L. REv. 709 (1987) (using Delaware as an example of successful state competition in
corporate law); Roberta Romano, State Competition for Corporate Charters, in THE NEW
FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 129 (John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds.,
1997) (describing how states' laws enable competition for corporate charters and how Delaware
has succeeded in attracting corporations); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land
Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983) (arguing that the proper
mode for ensuring reasonable zoning variance decisions is to adopt a mediation model similar
to a market-mimicking model); Rotunda, supra note 6 (describing the Supreme Court's recent
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and placing it within its historical context); Charles M. Tie-
bout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (presenting an economic
model that yields a solution for achieving the optimal level of expenditures for local public
goods); Weingast, supra note 11 (analyzing federalism's self-enforcing restraints against confis-
cating the wealth of citizens in the context of three rapidly developing economies); Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977) (arguing that state corporate legal systems protect shareholders and that state regulation
is generally preferable to federal).I! See Weingast, supra note 11, at 1 ("Federalism proved fundamental to the impressive eco-
nomic rise of ... the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries.").
14 Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1997) (arguing
that it is difficult to realize the benefits of federalism because the obstruction of rent-seeking
Nov. 2004]
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out this Article we remain agnostic on this issue. Whether a federal
regulation is driven by public interest or rent seeking, our sole con-
cern is with how the Court can gradually identify and screen out ap-
plications of antitrust regulations that do not plausibly involve inter-
state economic spillovers. The Court can thereby move toward the
proper balance of dual sovereignty, and political competition should
increasingly limit the sum of economic rents the respective sovereigns
are able to extract.15
Competitive federalism has clear implications for the evolution of
Sherman Act jurisdiction. This evolution provides a useful roadmap
to help the Court find the appropriate jurisdictional balance for its
general Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It is both fitting and in-
structive that case law under one of the nation's first pieces of Com-
merce Clause legislation would provide such a roadmap,"6 for this is
where judicial understanding of the relevant market failure can be
expected to have evolved furthest to reduce legal uncertainty raised
by the statutory shock. Passed in response to fears that the great
trusts were beyond the power of any state to effectively regulate owing• • * 17
to a political market failure, the Sherman Act prohibits only re-
straints of trade or commerce "among the several States."'8 For more
than eighty years following passage of the Act, the Court struggled to
identify the nature of the market failure resulting from various busi-
ness practices alleged to restrain. This led to a patchwork of conflict-
ing decisions, judicial confusion over the proper objective of the Act,
and condemnation of business activities now widely recognized as
pro-competitive. As economic theory progressed it gave the Court
increasing insight into the nature and effect of various trade re-
cannot be disentangled from the costs of federalism, such as encouragement of negative exter-
nalities and free riding).
15 Cf Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Themy of Regulation,
16J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987) (describing ways other than rent creation that politicians can gain
from private parties). We discuss the issue of rent seeking more fully infra text accompanying
notes 272-73.
16 The first piece of federal Commerce Clause regulation was the Interstate Commerce Act,
ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
17 See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Fonndation of Antitrust Federalism, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 657, 658-60, 660 n.9, 689-91, 690 n.147 (1993) (describing the enactment
of the Sherman Act as resulting from the states' inability adequately to regulate trusts); cf
Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 41 n.40 (noting that the Supreme Court made state regulation of
trusts difficult because the Court held that states could not regulate goods in interstate com-
merce).
18 Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads as follows: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209
(1890). Section 2 of the Act reads as follows: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.... ." Id. § 2.
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straints. Driven largely by the Chicago School of economics,' 9 anti-
trust scholars began to develop and test hypotheses regarding a host
of business practices that were argued to restrain trade.2 0 This proc-
ess eventually generated a body of scientific knowledge sufficiently re-
liable to support expert testimony on the nature of the market failure
associated with trade restraints, now widely regarded as the defen-
dants' exercise of market power. The problem with market power is
not that it allows firms to suppress competition or earn monopoly
profits, but that it may lead them to misallocate resources by reducing
output and raising prices to consumers. Courts and commentators
now largely agree that the exclusive substantive objective of the
Sherman Act is to promote consumer welfare.
Case law under the Sherman Act has since evolved toward a body
of clear, workable substantive rules. But relying uncritically on the
substantial effects test from its decisions on general Commerce
Clause jurisdiction, the Court has routinely upheld applications of
the Sherman Act to restraints that harm consumers only locally, if at
all. The Court's most recent jurisdictional decision under the Act in-
dicates that it has yet to recognize the consumer welfare standard's
profound jurisdictional implications. In Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pin-
23has, a narrow majority of the Court found that an alleged conspiracy
by a chain of hospitals to exclude a single doctor from the Los Ange-
les market for eye surgery had a sufficient nexus to interstate com-
merce to support jurisdiction under the Act. The Court reasoned
that the defendants' alleged restraint on the practice of ophthal-
mological services should be measured by its impact on other market
participants not just by its impact on the respondent.24 Joined in dis-
sent by three members of the Court, Justice Scalia noted that the ma-
jority's "analysis tells us nothing about the substantiality of the impact
l9 Some have criticized the Chicago School for being ideologically motivated. Whether true
or not, this criticism is largely irrelevant because the Chicago School focused on scientific hy-
pothesis testing. The spirit of this approach can be found in Milton Friedman's pioneering es-
say, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953) (describing
how economics can be used to predict phenomena through hypothesis testing).
20 This literature is too large to reference in full. Perhaps the first contributor was John
McGee, who suggested in an early article that predatory pricing is irrational and that according
to the trial record of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 69 (1911), the Standard Oil
Company never actually used it. John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.)
Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958).
21 D. Bruce Johnsen, Daubert, The Scientific Method, and Economic Expert Testimony, 9 KAN.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 149 (1999) (addressing the admissibility of economic expert testimony under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
22 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 (1978) and concluding that Congress
intended the Sherman Act to be a "consumer welfare prescription").
23 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
24 Id. at 331.
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on interstate commerce generated by the particular conduct at issue
here."25 He also argued that the Sherman Act does not "prohibit all
conspiracies that have sufficient constitutional 'nexus' to interstate
commerce to be regulated. It prohibits only those conspiracies that
are 'in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.'
This language commands a judicial inquiry into the nature and po-
tential effect of each particular restraint."
26
Following Summit, federal courts have regularly entertained cases
in which the interstate exercise of market power is so unlikely that
the defendants' restraint should be presumed as a matter of law to be
purely intrastate. 7 In the spirit of Justice Scalia's dissent, the second
step the Court should take to realign its approach to Commerce
Clause jurisdiction is to overturn Summit by formally recognizing the
jurisdictional implications of the consumer welfare standard. If the
market failure justifying federal regulation of trade restraints is the
exercise of market power, and if the problem with market power is
that it injures consumers by raising prices, then, according to com-
petitive federalism, trade restraints that do not plausibly increase
prices to consumers outside the home state should lie beyond federal
reach.
Summit's expansive test for federal antitrust jurisdiction stands in
contrast to the Court's more recent decisions addressing Congress's
general Commerce Clause jurisdiction, which, though themselves
supported by only narrow majorities, reflect the Court's growing ap-
preciation for competitive federalism. In United States v. Lopez, for
example, the Court struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones
Act (1990) as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause jurisdiction be-
cause the criminal activity it addressed was neither commercial nor
economic in nature and therefore could not possibly have had a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. In United States v. Morrison,29
the Court more recently struck down the civil remedy provision of
the Violence Against Women Act (1994), again because the criminal
activity it addressed was neither commercial nor economic in nature.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in both majority opinions, to find
otherwise would convert the Commerce Clause into a general police
Id. at 336 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 333-34 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Perhaps in an effort to highlight the absurdity of the majority's holding in Summit, Judge
Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted in reviewing a post-
Summit challenge to Sherman Act jurisdiction that if two children operating competing lemon-
ade stands agreed to fix prices there is no clear principle preventing them from being subject to
the jurisdiction of the Act, even though "the effect on the national economy would be slight."
Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 780 (1994).
28 514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995).
529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
[Vol. 7:2
THE EVOLUTION OF SHERMANACTJURISDICTION
power constitutionally reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment.30 The Court's obvious appreciation for competitive
federalism in Lopez and Morrison suggests that it may be inclined to
continue in this direction in future cases.
The remainder of this Article builds the normative case in favor of
competitive federalism and shows how its implications for Sherman
Act jurisdiction can be used to guide the evolution of general Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction. Part I reviews the relevant case law. It be-
gins with a brief look at a selection of notable cases on general Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction and then turns specifically to the case law
on Sherman Actjurisdiction. Our intent in reviewing this body of law
is merely to lay a foundation to show that the geographic market
power test is broadly consistent with Commerce Clause case law as it
has evolved over the past 180 years.
Part II describes the simple economics of market power and illus-
trates the practical approach antitrust regulators have developed un-
der the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines ("Merger Guidelines") to
define the relevant product and geographic markets.3 ' This approach
uses the geographic antitrust market to assess the likely effect of horizon-
tal mergers on market power and consumer welfare, but we show it
can easily be adapted to assess the interstate effects of any category of
trade restraints.
Part III describes what we characterize as the geographic market
power test for Sherman Actjurisdicton. According to this test, to es-
tablish federal jurisdiction under the Act the complainant must allege
and ultimately prove that the defendant has a sufficiently large share
of the geographic antitrust market that it can plausibly exercise mar-
ket power "in more States than one."33 Although straightforward, this
jurisdictional test is novel, substantively reasoned, and completely
consistent with the methodology antitrust regulators use under the
Merger Guidelines to evaluate the substantive merits of horizontal34
mergers. The geographic market power test resolves a number of
troubling inconsistencies in the Court's case law on federal antitrust
jurisdiction.
Part IV demonstrates the analytical force of the geographic mar-
ket power test. We show that it is consistent with the statutory intent
30 Id. at 618; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
31 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992) [hereinafter
Merger Guidelines].
32 D. Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya, A Geographic Market Power Test for Sherman Act Jurisdic-
tion, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT 223 (Michael S. Greve & Richard A. Epstein eds.,
2004).
33 This was Justice Marshall's interpretation of "among the several states" in Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
34 Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,554, § 1.1.
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behind the Sherman Act, and that within the framework of competi-
tive federalism it is the only economically sensible approach to setting
appropriate limits on federal antitrust jurisdiction. Moreover, the
geographic market power test will resolve the current turmoil over
Sherman Actjurisdiction in the federal circuits and hasten the rate at
which the Court's understanding of novel business practices evolves.
Part V concludes by sketching a model of how case law evolves in
response to the judicial uncertainty created by statutory shocks. We
show that the geographic market power test is a compelling step in
the evolution of Sherman Act jurisdiction and that it provides the
Court with a useful roadmap to realign its approach to general
Commerce Clause jurisdiction. The legal uncertainty that attends
most regulatory statutes prevents the Court from acting too quickly,
but as the Court gradually accumulates the stock of knowledge neces-
sary to identify the geographic scope of the underlying market fail-
ure, it can and should require an increasingly clear nexus between
the proscribed conduct and an interstate spillover. This will allow the
Court to achieve a balance of dual sovereignty consistent with com-
petitive federalism while posing little immediate threat to constitu-
tional precedent.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL COMMERCE CLAUSEJURISDICTION
35[A] dmittedly, our case law [on 'substantial effects'] has not been clear ....
Every first-year law student learns that the federal government de-
rives its sovereign authority from a limited set of powers enumerated
in the Constitution. Although the Supremacy Clause ensures that
these powers are plenary, 6 and the Necessary and Proper Clause en-
sures that they include the power to do whatever is necessary to effec-
37tuate them, any power not specifically conferred on the federal gov-
ernment by the Constitution is expressly reserved to the sovereign
states, or to the people, by the Tenth Amendment.38 These residual
powers include the states' local "police powers." Various enumerated
federal powers have proven to be elastic, but perhaps none more so
than the Commerce Clause, whose jurisprudence prescribes the deli-
cate balance of dual sovereignty characteristic of our federal system.
This section briefly reviews the Supreme Court's case law on federal
Commerce Clause jurisdiction in four parts.
Lopez, 514 U.S, at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
36 U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
37 Id. art. I, § 8.
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Id. amend. X.
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Part L.A examines the early era, beginning with Justice Marshall's
famous opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.s9 The ensuing case law during
this era focused largely on the resolution of conflicts between state
laws that discriminated against interstate commerce and unexercised
federal commerce power-the so-called "negative," or "dormant,"
Commerce Clause. By the end of the era it tended toward a narrow
and formalistic reading of the Commerce Clause. Part I.B examines
the transitional era beginning with passage of the Sherman Act,
marking the rise of the affirmative Commerce Clause. During this
time, the Court gradually broadened federal authority over interstate
commerce, ultimately rejecting, distinguishing, or simply ignoring
many of its early decisions.4 0 The transitional era witnessed a stun-
ning increase in the number of federal statutes and culminated in the
wake of the New Deal with the Court's famous decision in Wickard v.
Filburn.41  V'ickard dramatically broadened federal commerce power
by extending it to purely local activity that, when aggregated horizon-
tally across all those covered by the regulation, "exerts a substantialIn ,,42
economic effect on interstate commerce. Part LC examines the
modern era, focusing largely on federal antitrust jurisdiction under
Wickard's aggregated substantial effects test up through the Court's
decision in Summit.43 This era has been marked by a virtual prolifera-
tion of federal statutes tied to the Commerce Clause, many of them
having little to do with obviously commercial activity. In upholding
these statutes, the Court continued to expand general federal com-
merce power under the aggregated substantial effects test, leading to
realistic concerns that federal authority had completely swallowed the
local police powers of the several states." Part I.D examines the
Court's case law following Summit, which appears to embrace the
framework of competitive federalism and may signal a post-modern
39 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
40 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4.6-4.8 (3d ed. 1999) (documenting the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence between 1888 and the present).
41 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
42 Id. at 125.
43 Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328-29 (1991) ("During the past cen-
tury... the federal power over commerce... [has] experienced similar expansion.").
See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 816 (observing the "increasingly untenable position of claiming
the power to strike down invocations of the Commerce Clause, while at the same time applying
a set of doctrines that made it impossible actually to exercise this power"); Rotunda, supra note
6, at 902 (reviewing "commandeering" concerns over congressional direction of state legislative
action and holding that "the ultimate purpose of the separation of powers... is to protect indi-
viduals"); see also Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CINN.
L. REv. 199, 259 (1971) (discussing the possibility of a comprehensive affirmative action pro-
gram nationwide).
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era destined to impose real constraints on federal Commerce Clause
jurisdiction.
A. The Early Era
In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court struck down a New York law grant-
ing a monopoly to Robert Fulton over the transport of passengers by
steamboat between New Jersey and New York because it directly con-
flicted with a federal statute regulating the "coasting trade."45 In pre-
scribing the limits of federal authority over interstate commerce, Mar-
shall found that "[c] ommerce among the States, cannot stop at the
external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the
interior." He went on to elaborate in the following famous passage,
which the Court has interpreted at various times to support both nar-
row and broad federal commerce powers:
Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be re-
stricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one.... The
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that some-
thing.., must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State[, which
does] not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to inter-
fere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the gov-
47ernment.
This statement draws an illusive distinction between state author-
ity over completely internal commerce-which is reserved to the
states-and federal authority over internal commerce that affects
other states-which is the proper subject of federal regulation. In
practice, the distinction has proven difficult to apply with any kind of
precision because Marshall declined to provide a functional blueprint
for identifying the nature of the "effects" necessary to resolve the bal-
ance of dual sovereignty. As we show later, the simple economics of
market power provides such a blueprint in the field of antitrust that
might usefully be generalized to other fields.
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,4 the petitioner challenged an 1803
Pennsylvania statute requiring vessels sailing in or out of the port of
Philadelphia to employ a local pilot to navigate the Delaware River.
After Cooley refused the services of a pilot for his vessels, the Phila-
delphia Board of Wardens assessed him one-half the normal pilotage
fee required by the statute. Being licensed under the federal statute
to carry on the coasting trade, Cooley demurred, claiming the Penn-
sylvania statute was invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause.
45 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
46 Id. at 194.
47 Id. at 194-95.
48 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851).
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According to Justice Curtis, whether unexercised federal commerce
power over a particular subject is exclusive depends crucially on the
nature of the subject. "[T]he power to regulate commerce[] em-
braces a vast field, containing. . . exceedingly various subjects, quite
unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uni-
form rule... and some, like the subject now in question, as impera-
tively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local neces-
sities of navigation., 9 In his view, "the nature of [pilotage] is such as
to leave no doubt of the superior fitness and propriety, not to say the
absolute necessity, of different systems of regulation, drawn from lo-
cal knowledge and experience, and conformed to local wants."50 Jus-
tice Curtis thus made an early assertion of competitive federalism as
the proper framework for identifying the nature of the effects neces-
sary to resolve the balance of dual sovereignty.
The ensuing case law, much of it addressing dormant commerce
powers, led the Court to a narrower and more formalistic view of fed-
eral commerce jurisdiction, while at the same time developing the
concept of exclusive "state police powers" under the Tenth Amend-
ment.' The Court's increasing formalism gradually gave weight to
the now discarded notion-characterized as "dual federalism"-that
state and federal powers repose in separate geographic "spheres of
sovereignty. ''52 Most notably, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co.
v. Illinois,53 the Court found that a state statute prohibiting discrimi-
nation in railroad rates "for any distance within the State" would not
have conflicted with the federal commerce power if its application
had been confined to shipments occurring completely within the
state. The Court struck down the statute in the case at hand, how-
ever, because it prohibited discrimination against shipments originat-
ing in Illinois but bound for other states. 4
Perhaps the Court's most formalistic statement of dual sovereignty
came in Kidd v. Pearson.55 In upholding a state statute allowing the
importation and sale of intoxicating liquors within the state but pro-
hibiting in-state manufacture, even for export, the Court stated:
49 Id. at 319.
50 Id. at 320.
51 Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1950) (discussing
emergence of "police power" concept in the Taney Court).
52 See Cavil, supra note 17, at 678 n.90 ("Under the theory of dual federalism, the states and
the federal government were viewed as co-sovereigns, with distinct and inviolable spheres of
authority."); Bruce Little, Note, A Case ofJudicial Backsliding: Artificial Restraints on the Commerce
Power Reach of the Sherman Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 168 (1985) (describing the view that in-
terstate commerce involves the flow of goods across state lines).
53 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
5 Id. at 571-72.
55 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
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If it be held that [commerce] includes the regulation of all such manu-
factures as are intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in
the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include .... every
branch of human industry.... [I]t would follow as an inevitable result
that the duty would devolve on Congress to regulate all of these delicate,
multiform, and vital interests-interests which in their nature are and
56must be, local in all the details of their successful management.
Such a scheme, the Court insisted, would be impracticable.
B. The Transitional Era
United States v. E. C. Knight Co.57 was the first case to address the ex-
tent of federal antitrust jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause and
it proved to be a false start. The restraint in question was a proposed
horizontal combination between five sugar manufacturers that would
have allowed its largest member, the American Sugar Refining Com-
pany, to control roughly ninety-eight percent of domestic sugar refin-
ing capacity. Relying heavily on Kidds statement of dual federalism,
the Court conceded that the combination would establish a "monop-
oly in manufacture," but found that it was nonetheless beyond the
federal power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. In the
Court's reasoning,
the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves in a cer-
tain sense the control of its disposition.., and although the exercise of
that power may result in bringing the operation of commerce into play, it
does not control it, and affects it only incidentally and indirectly. Com-
merce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.
58
E. C. Knight's formalistic approach began to unravel only six years
later in Swift & Co. v. United States,59 where the Court struck down a
collusive agreement between the dealers of sixty percent of the fresh
meat in the country. Although their agreement to reduce the prices
at which they bought livestock and raise the prices at which they sold
fresh meat at wholesale applied to transactions strictly within single
states, the Court had little trouble finding the agreement well within
the reach of federal commerce power. Justice Holmes summarily
dismissed E.C. Knight's formalistic view of federal commerce power in
favor of a more functional approach, concluding that "commerce
among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical
one, drawn from the course of business."' The Court lay to rest any
doubt about the status of E.C. Knight in its landmark decision in Stan-
56 Id. at 21.
57 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
5 Id. at 12.
59 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
Sd. at 398.
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dard Oil Co. v. United States,6 where it expressly rejected as "unsound"
the formalistic distinction between commerce and manufacture. Its
case law thereafter began to embrace the more functional approach
Holmes shaped in Swift.
In the Shreveport Rate Case,2 the Court upheld an Interstate Com-
merce Commission order aimed at preventing discriminatory railroad
rates by equalizing rates between Louisiana and Texas with those be-
tween equally-distant points entirely within the state of Texas. Un-
dermining its earlier decision in Wabash, the Court found that the
economic effects of purely intrastate activities of various rail carriers
were so closely and substantially related to their interstate activities
that Congress has the power to "prevent the common instrumentali-
ties of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from being
used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate com-
merce ' 63 as long as federal control of intrastate rates is "essential or
appropriate to the securit, of that traffic... [and] the efficiency of
the interstate service 
....
Roughly fifteen years later, Franklin Roosevelt's unprecedented
New Deal legislation ushered in a host of conflicts between state po-
lice powers and the affirmative Commerce Clause. Initially, in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States65 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,66 the
Court retreated to the distinction between direct and indirect effects
on commerce it had relied on in E.C. Knight. Striking down the
wages and hours provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
67
the Court in Schechter found that persons employed in purely intra-
state activities have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce
and therefore fall outside the reach of federal commerce power.68
Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan quickly put an end to this retreat.Y In
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court addressed a challenge
to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 7° which prohibited em-
ployers from engaging in various "unfair labor practices affecting
61 221 U.S. 1, 69 (1911).
62 Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1918) [hereinafter
Shreveport Rate Case].
Id. at 353.
Id. at 351. For a detailed discussion of the Shreveport Rate Case, see Richard A. Epstein, The
Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 75 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1415-21 (1987).
65 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
66 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("Mining brings the subject matter of commerce into existence,
Commerce disposes of it.").
67 15 U.S.C. §§ 703-10, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (as amended and modified by Act of June
14, 1935, ch. 246, 49 Stat. 275).
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 543.
69 See Epstein, supra note 64, at 1443; Rotunda, supra note 6, at 872 n.12.
70 29 U.S.C. § 151, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
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commerce."7  Although purporting to preserve the distinction be-
tween commerce among the several states and commerce completely
internal to states,72 Chief Justice Hughes abandoned Schechte's direct-
indirect effects distinction. Instead, he found that the reach of the
federal commerce power is necessarily a question of degree, extend-
ing to intrastate activities having "such a close and substantial relation
to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens 
and obstructions."
Five years later, in Wickard v. Filburn,4 the Court cemented Jones &
Laughlin Steers "close and substantial relation" approach, finally put-
ting to rest the formalistic distinctions it relied on in Wabash, Kidd,
E. C. Knight, and Schechter and expanding federal commerce power to
what may be "the outer limits" of the constitutional authority. In
Wickard, the Agricultural Adjustment Act 75 imposed a national quota
on the "marketing" of wheat, and the Secretary of Agriculture's mar-
keting orders in turn allotted the national quota to individual farms,
including Filburn's. When Filburn produced what the Court con-
ceded was a "trivial" amount of wheat in excess of his allotment
purely for use and consumption on the farm, the Secretary assessed
him a marketing penalty. Filburn claimed the marketing quotas were
beyond the reach of federal commerce jurisdiction because they ap-
plied to strictly local production and consumption whose effects on
interstate commerce, if any, were merely "indirect."7 6 The Court flatly
rejected Filburn's claim. Noting that Justice Marshall's opinion in
Gibbons "described the federal commerce power with a breadth never
yet exceeded," 77 Justice Jackson found that Congress can regulate
even local production for farm use that is trivial by itself if, aggre-
gated horizontally across many local producers, "it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce" by displacing market trans-
7 301 U.S. 1, 22 (1937).
72 As the Court put it,
The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstruc-
tions .... must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not
be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.
Id. at 36-37.
73 Id. at 37.
74 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
75 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).
76 Id. at 119.
77 Id. at 120. Jackson also made the following point: "At the beginning Chief Justice Mar-
shall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. He made em-
phatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power by warning that effective restraints
on its exercise must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes." Id. (citation
omitted).
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actions that would otherwise occur." We characterize this as the cu-
mulative or aggregated "substantial effects" test for federal commerce
jurisdiction. 9
C. The Modern Era
Three years after its expansive decision in Wickard v. Filburn, the
Court decided Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co.,80 specifically relying on Wickards horizontal aggregation principle
to establish Sherman Act jurisdiction over an agreement among local
sugar beet refiners. The complaint alleged that the defendant, one
of three refiners located in northern California, conspired with the
other two refiners to revise the standard form contract they used to
buy beets from nearby growers. Prior to the revision, growers' re-
ceipts from refiners were based on a formula multiplying the number
of pounds of beets purchased by the percentage of the refiner's net
returns per pound of beets from sugar sales, all adjusted by the tested
sugar content of the grower's beets over the period covered by the
contract." The revised contracts specified instead that the grower's
receipts were to be determined by the average net return of all three
refiners combined.
The plaintiffs, a group of growers that had agreed to the revised
contract, later brought an action under the Sherman Act alleging the
defendant's actions illegally fixed the price of sugar beets and
thereby restrained interstate commerce in sugar.2 Yet, the district
court judge inferred just the opposite from the face of the contracts
contained in the complaint, according to which the price of sugar in
interstate commerce determined the price the defendant refiners
paid per pound of raw beets to the growers. To expedite an appeal
on the question of federal jurisdiction, the district court allowed the
78 Id. at 125.
79 It is worth noting that Congress specifically anticipated the problem posed by the cumula-
tive effects of non-market production by including wheat grown and used for home consump-
tion in the Act's definition of the national marketing quota. Id. at 118-19.
8o 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
81 The contracts also specified that the growers would buy all seed from the refiner, cultivate
beets only on specifically designated land, and sell exclusively to the refiner. Further, the re-
finer had a right to supervise the planting, cultivation, irrigation, and harvesting of the beets,
including "the right to ascertain quality through growing and harvesting seasons by sampling
and polarizing." Id. at 222-23. The contracts therefore consisted of a bilateral sharing ar-
rangement between each refiner and the growers with whom it had entered into contracts, with
each grower's relative share being adjusted according to the measured sugar content of its own
beets. The sugar content of the growers' beets, the price per pound of refined sugar net of the
refiner's selling costs, and the growers' production costs per pound determined their profits.
The refiners' production costs and the price of refined sugar net of selling costs determined
their profits.
82 Id. at 226 n.6.
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plaintiffs to amend their complaint to eliminate the allegation that
the defendant's restraint "affected the price of sugar in interstate
commerce," in essence replacing it with the charge that the restraint
of trade in beets independently affected interstate commerce.83
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Rutledge found that the
three refiners were the only practical market for the petitioners' beets
owing to high transport costs and barriers to entry by competing re-
finers. As a result, the conspirators controlled the quantity of sugar
manufactured and sold in interstate commerce from northern Cali-
fornia. 4 In response to the defendant's claim that the three refiners
were powerless to affect the national price of sugar, Rutledge found
"[t]he idea that stabilization of prices paid for the only raw material
consumed in an industry has no influence toward reducing competi-
tion in the distribution of the finished product, in an integrated in-
dustry such as this, is impossible to accept."85 Drawing on Wickard's
horizontal aggregation principle, he reasoned that
Congress' power to keep the interstate market free of goods produced
under conditions inimical to the general welfare may be exercised in in-
dividual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate com-
merce; it is enough that the individual activity when multiplied into a
general practice ... contains a threat to the interstate economy that re-
86quires preventive regulation .
In United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 7 the Court took a
more limited approach to federal commerce power. There, the gov-
ernment brought a civil action to enjoin various medical associations
and doctors that had joined together to provide affordable prepaid
medical plans to subscribing patients entirely within the state of Ore-
gon. Because the plans drew providing doctors from the patients' lo-
cal community and because the doctors associated themselves exclu-
sively with either the state or the county medical society's plan, the
government claimed the arrangements amounted to territorial allo-
cations in restraint of interstate commerce under Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. Justice Jackson rejected the Government's claim
noting that there was no evidence of an attempt by the defendants to
withhold medical service. According to Justice Jackson, the only in-
terstate commerce involved related to a few "sporadic" and "inciden-
tal" payments to "out-of-state doctors" for patients who happened to
be temporarily away from their local service areas in Oregon."' This
was insufficient to show a restraint of trade in interstate commerce.
85 Id. at 247.
84 Id. at 240-41.
85 Id. at 241.
86 Id. at 236 (citations omitted).
87 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
88 Id. at 338-39.
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Instead, he reasoned that the government would have had to show
interstate commerce was adversely affected specifically by the "alloca-
tion of territories by doctor-sponsored plans, [but as] far as any evi-
dence brought to [the Court's] attention discloses, the activities of
the latter are wholly intrastate.""9 In the antitrust setting, Justice Jack-
son apparently eschewed application of the horizontal aggregation
principle he had announced in Wickard. This surely would have al-
lowed him to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce if he
had chosen to follow Justice Rutledge's use of horizontal aggregation
in Mandeville Island Farms.90
In the midst of the Great Society programs of the 1960s, the Court
handed down a number of decisions dramatically expanding general
federal commerce power under the substantial effects test while fail-
ing to identify any principled limitation on its application.91 The
most obvious expansion was driven by the compelling social objective
in the realm of civil rights, where the underlying evil-racial dis-
crimination-had little obvious connection to commercial activity.
This expansion is most clearly evident in Katzenbach v. McClung,
92
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,93 and Daniel v. Paul,94 where
the Court relied on both horizontal and vertical aggregation to show
that the defendants' seemingly local activities substantially affected
interstate commerce. The Court's reasoning went something like
this: Even if a particular instance of racial discrimination in a local
restaurant's food sales does not, by itself, substantially affect interstate
commerce, it is sufficient if that restaurant's vertically related inputs,
say, its raw food supplies, are "in commerce." This is because the
food supplies of all restaurants engaged in racial discrimination,
when aggregated horizontally, comprise a substantial portion of in-
terstate commerce. If such restaurants were magically to vanish-that
is, but-for their existence-the economic effect on the quantum or
character of interstate commerce would surely be substantial in some
way. These cases explicitly reject any requirement that the party as-
serting Commerce Clause jurisdiction show a nexus between the spe-
89 Id.
334 U.S. 219 (1948).
91 Given that the Sherman Act's reach is said to be coincident with the limits of constitu-
tional commerce power, the underlying tension between Mandeville Island Farms and Oregon
State Medical Society was thereby resolved in favor of Mandeville Island Farms. Perhaps, however,
Mandeville Island Farms and Oregon State Medical Society can be distinguished procedurally. Man-
deville Island Farms involved an appeal from a pre-trial dismissal, whereas Oregon State Medical
Society involved an appeal from a dismissal following a full trial on the merits.
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
95 379 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1964).
94 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
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cific instance of racial discrimination and an effect on interstate com-
merce.
By 1975, the vertical aggregation principle on which the Court re-
lied in the civil rights cases began to creep into its decisions on
Sherman Act jurisdiction. In Goldfarb v. Virginia,95 the Court consid-
ered a challenge to the Fairfax County Bar Association's ("FCBA")
minimum fee schedule. When the plaintiffs were unable to find an
attorney willing to perform an examination for their residential real
estate closing for a reduced fee, they filed a class action suit alleging
that the FCBA's minimum fee schedule violated Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act.96 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice
Burger reasoned that, as a practical matter, title examinations are in-
dispensable to the financing of real estate transactions because lend-
ers require them as a condition for making a loan. Since a substantial
volume of real estate loans originated outside the state, and "[g] iven
the substantial volume of commerce involved, and the inseparability
of [tide examinations] from the interstate aspects of real estate trans-
actions," he concluded that "interstate commerce has been suffi-
ciently affected, 97 regardless of whether the fee schedule could be
shown to reduce the number of title examinations or increase fees.
Thus, according to Burger's assessment, but-for the availability of all
title examinations aggregated horizontally the market for a vertically-
related input in the stream of commerce-real estate financing-
would surely suffer a substantial economic effect sufficient to support
federal jurisdiction. 98
In Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,9 the Court ex-
tended the cumulative effects test to a local hospital's alleged attempt
to restrict the supply of hospital beds. The substance of the petition-
ers claim was that Rex Hospital and others conspired to monopolize
the hospital business in Raleigh, North Carolina, by attempting to
prevent the petitioner from expanding its hospital facilities in that
market. Although the petitioner's hospital business was strictly local,
it asserted the necessary connection to interstate commerce because a
substantial portion of its own medicines and supplies, insurance pro-
ceeds, management services, and construction loans came from out-
side the state. The district court dismissed the petitioner's amended
complaint because it failed to allege a sufficient nexus between the
9 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
97 Id. at 785.
98 Justice Burger went on to note that "there may be legal services that have no nexus with
interstate commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act," but he gave no indi-
cation of how a party might make such a factual showing within the parameters set by the re-
mainder of his opinion. Id. at 785-86.
99 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
[Vol. 7:2
THE EVOLUTION OFSHERMANACTJURISDICTION
claimed violations of the Sherman Act and interstate commerce, but
in doing so it apparently failed clearly to indicate whether it had
based its dismissal on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or on the pe-
titioner's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Sitting en banc, the court of appeals affirmed, finding that the peti-
tioner's hospital business was strictly local and that the petitioner
failed adequately to allege in the amended complaint that the re-
spondents' actions had or would likely have had an effect on any
market price or a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. Stating that the
basis for the district court's dismissal was irrelevant, Justice Marshall
argued that "[i]n either event, the critical inquiry is into the ade-
quacy of the nexus between respondents' conduct and interstate
commerce that is alleged in the complaint."'00 Marshall went on to
find that "[a]n effect can be 'substantial' under the Sherman Act
even if its impact on interstate commerce falls far short
of ... affecting market price."10' He concluded that the petitioner's
complaint was wholly adequate to state a claim in this case because it
"fairly [alleges that the] conspiracy, to the extent it is successful, will
place 'unreasonable burdens on the free and uninterrupted flow' of
,,102interstate commerce.
In spite of the Court's back-door acceptance of horizontal aggre-
gation in Mandeville Island Farms and vertical aggregation in Goldfarb,
most circuits continued to require Sherman Act plaintiffs to establish
jurisdiction in one of two ways. The plaintiff could claim either that
the allegedly unlawful conduct itself took place "in commerce" or
that the allegedly unlawful conduct had a "substantial effect" on in-
terstate commerce, even though it took place intrastate. In McLain v.
Real Estate Board,13 however, the Court found Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion where the defendants' broader business activities, aggregated
vertically, were in interstate commerce even though the allegedly
unlawful conduct was not.
The plaintiff class of real estate buyers in McLain claimed that real
estate brokers in the greater New Orleans area had engaged in a mas-
sive conspiracy to fix commission rates, split fees, and suppress useful
market information. The only connection between the conspiracy
and interstate commerce shown by the plaintiffs was that brokers rou-
tinely, though gratuitously, advised buyers on how to obtain title in-
surance and financing, often from sources outside Louisiana. The
district court found that the defendants' brokerage activity occurred
100 Id. at 742 n.1.
1o1 Id. at 745.
102 Id. at 746.
103 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
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entirely in Louisiana and that the plaintiffs failed to allege, as re-
quired by Goldfarb, that the provision of insurance and financing con-
stituted a large volume of interstate commerce inseparable from bro-
kerage services. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint for lack of
federal jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.
0 4
Chief Justice Burger reversed the lower courts, finding that they
had misinterpreted Goldfarb. That case, he asserted, addressed the
"in commerce" test rather than the "substantial effects" test. To es-
tablish that the defendants' activities were in the stream of com-
merce, it was necessary to show that they were an "integral part of an
interstate transaction. , 105 As in Goldfarb, such a showing is unneces-
sary where the alleged basis for federal jurisdiction is the substantial
effects test, which "in no way restricted it to those challenged activi-
ties that have an integral relationship to an activity in interstate
commerce."106 As Burger described the substantial effects test:
To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act violation it
would be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial effect on
interstate commerce generated by respondents' [broader] brokerage ac-
tivity. Petitioners need not make the more particularized showing of an
effect on interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix
commission rates, or by those other aspects of respondents' activity that
are alleged to be unlawful.... If establishing jurisdiction required a
showing that the unlawful conduct itself had an effect on interstate
commerce, jurisdiction would be defeated by a demonstration that the al-
leged restraint failed to have its intended anticompetitive effect. This is
107not the rule of our cases.
Given the uncontroverted testimony from local lenders that an
appreciable amount of their residential real estate loans occurred in
interstate commerce, Burger concluded that "there remains only the
requirement that respondents' activities which allegedly have been
infected by a price-fixing conspiracy be shown 'as a matter of practi-
cal economics' to have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate
commerce involved."'0 ° The infected activities version of the substan-
tial effects test apparently requires the plaintiff to allege only that the
defendants' unlawful conduct stands to have a "not insubstantial ef-
fect" on interstate commerce because, being interstate, the defen-
dants' broader vertically-related business activities, such as title insur-
ance and real estate financing, can be presumed to have a substantial
104 The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), while the court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling for failure of subject
matter jurisdiction under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1).
106 McLain, 444 U.S. at 244.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 242.
108 Id. at 246 (quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 745 (1976)).
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economic effect on interstate commerce when aggregated horizon-
tally across all defendants. That is, but-for the defendants' allegedly
unlawful conduct, the economic effect on the quantum or character
of interstate commerce would be substantial, and this, according to
Burger, was enough to carry the plaintiffs' jurisdictional burden.
Finally, in Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas,'09 the Court established its
most expansive version of the substantial effects test, finding that a
Sherman Act defendant's entire line of business can be infected by an
economically trivial local restraint. The plaintiff in that case was a li-
censed and very skilled eye surgeon who refused to hire the services
of a physician's assistant as required by the defendants' hospital pol-
icy. In response, the defendants-including the hospital at which the
plaintiff held staff privileges, its parent corporation, and several of
the plaintiffs fellow doctors who served on the hospital's peer review
board-initiated peer review proceedings resulting in severe restric-
tions on the plaintiffs practice and an impending group boycott of
his services by the defendants and other hospitals throughout the Los
Angeles area.1 The plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court alleg-
ing, among other things, that the defendants had conspired to drive
him out of the Los Angeles market by boycotting his services in an ef-
fort to increase their market share.' To establish federal jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant cor-
porate parent's hospitals served nonresident patients, received reim-
bursements from out-of-state insurers and the federal government,
purchased supplies from the stream of commerce, and distributed
peer review reports across state lines.' 2 In response to the defen-
dants' contention that the plaintiffs complaint failed to describe an
adequate nexus between the alleged group boycott and interstate
commerce, the district court dismissed the complaint.13 The court of
appeals reversed, finding that "'as a matter of practical economics'
the hospital's 'peer review process in general' obviously affected in-
terstate commerce." 114
Writing for the majority," 5 Justice Stevens found that the peti-
tioner was unquestionably engaged in interstate commerce even
though its primary activity involved the provision of general health
care services in a local market. Echoing the court of appeals, Stevens
reasoned that "[a]s 'a matter of practical economics,' the effect of
109 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
1I0 Id.
III Id.
112 Id. at 327-28.
11 Id. at 322.
14 Id. at 328.
15 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the
opinion.
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such a conspiracy on the hospital's 'purchases of out-of-state medi-
cines and supplies as well as its revenues from out-of-state insurance
companies' would establish the necessary interstate nexus."' 6 In re-
sponse to the petitioners' claim that a boycott of a single surgeon was
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, Stevens reasoned that the mere
existence of an illegal agreement violates the Act regardless of its ac-
tual effects and that, if successful, the conspiracy would surely have
reduced the supply of eye surgery in the Los Angeles market. ' 17 Quot-
ing McLain, he found that the respondent "need not make the more
particularized showing of an effect on interstate commerce caused by
the alleged conspiracy to fix commission rates, or by those other as-
pects of respondents' activity that are alleged to be unlawful."".. What
is more, according to Stevens, "[t]he competitive significance of re-
spondent's exclusion from the market must be measured, not just by
a particularized evaluation of his own practice, but rather, by a gen-
eral evaluation of the impact of the restraint on other participants
and potential participants in the market from which he has been ex-
cluded.""9
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Act's language, "in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States," 2 does in-
deed require the Court to examine the nature and likely effect of the
restraint in each particular case. In his view, McLain's "infected activ-
ity" test was the result of the Court's confusion over the law.' 2' Scalia
argued that the Court could easily have found jurisdiction in McLain,
given the massive conspiracy being alleged, but instead it resorted to
the infected activities test under the mistaken belief that "focusing
upon the effects of the restraint itself would require plaintiffs to
prove their case at the jurisdictional stage. That belief was in error,
since the prior approach had simply assumed, rather than required
proof of, the success of the conspiracy.' ' 22 As a result, Justice Scalia
lamented, the Court missed an opportunity to clear up the confusion
in the circuits following McLain and had in fact made things worse.
To establish Sherman Actjurisdiction in this case, he observed:
[The Court] looks neither to the effect on commerce of the restraint, nor
to the effect on commerce of the defendants' infected activity, but rather,
it seems, to the effect on commerce of the activity from which the plain-
tiff has been excluded. As I understand the Court's opinion, the test of
Sherman Act jurisdiction is whether the entire line of commerce from
116 Summit, 500 U.S. at 329 (citations omitted).
117 Id. at 331.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 332.
120 Id. at 333-34.
121 Id. at 335.
122 Id. (citation omitted).
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which Dr. Pinhas has been excluded affects interstate commerce. Since
excluding him from eye surgery at Midway Hospital effectively excluded
him from the entire Los Angeles market for eye surgery... the jurisdic-
tional question is simply whether that market affects interstate com-
merce, which of course it does. This analysis tells us nothing about the
substantiality of the impact on interstate commerce generated by the par-
ticular conduct at issue here.
Determining the "market" for a product or service, meaning the
scope of other products or services against which it must compete, is of
course necessary for many purposes of antitrust analysis. But today's
opinion does not identify a relevant "market" in that sense. It declares
Los Angeles to be the pertinent "market" only because that is the entire
scope of Dr. Pinhas' exclusion from practice.... I cannot understand
why "market" in the Court's peculiar sense has any bearing upon this re-
straint's impact on interstate commerce, and hence upon Sherman Act
jurisdiction. The Court does not even attempt to provide an explana-
tion.
12 3
Thus, the Court took vertical and horizontal aggregation to the
extreme; but-for the entire Los Angeles market for eye surgery, the
effect on the quantum or character of interstate commerce would be
substantial, and the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to establish
federal jurisdiction. Justice Scalia emphasized the absurdity of the
Court's but-for approach in pointedly observing that if "the alleged
conspirators in the present case had decided to effectuate the ulti-
mate exclusion of Dr. Pinhas, i.e., to have him killed, it would be ab-
surd to think that the world market in eye surgery would thereby be af-
fected."12 4  As Justice Scalia asserted, the Court's inference that
competition in the Los Angeles market could have been affected by
the exclusion of a single surgeon from the Los Angeles market there-
fore ignores the "'practical economics' of the matter.
1 25
D. The Post-Modern Era?
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Court began to limit the scope
of federal commerce power. The ensuing line of cases raises the
prospect that the Rehnquist Court has entered a post-modern era in
which it will continue to set limits on Congress's regulatory authority
under the Commerce Clause. Whether or not this is true remains to
be seen, but the case law thus far suggests that the Court has em-
braced the framework of competitive federalism in this field to guide
its decisions.
123 Id. at 336-37 (footnote omitted).
124 Id. at 338.
125 Id.
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In New York v. United States,126 the Court addressed the limits im-
posed on federal regulatory authority by the Tenth Amendment.
There, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985 127 imposed on states the obligation to dispose of radioactive
waste generated within their borders. The Act provided for a system
of incentives to encourage the states to comply with this obligation.
Among other things, the "take title" incentive required states that
failed to provide for disposal of radioactive waste generated within
the state to assume tide and take possession of the waste and to bear
any liability imposed on the generator arising from their failure to do
SO.
The State of New York and two of its counties brought suit against
the United States seeking a declaratory judgment that the incentive
system was in conflict with the Tenth Amendment. The Court found
that, although severable from the rest of the Act, the take title incen-
tive was unconstitutionally coercive and therefore fell outside Con-
gress's enumerated powers. Injustice O'Connor's words:
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste,
standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because
a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would also be beyond the au-
thority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the
States a choice between the two.... Either way, "the Act commandeers
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to en-
act and enforce a federal regulatory program" ....
... Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Con-
gress' enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sover-
eignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent
with the federal structure of our Government established by the Consti-
tution. 28
In United States v. Lo ez'9 the Court struck down the federal Gun-
Free School Zones Act, specifically rejecting unconstrained aggre-
gation to establish a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As
ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated for the majority,
possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic ac-
tivity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any
sort of interstate commerce....
126 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
127 Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2022).
128 Id. at 176-77 (citation omitted).
l2 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
130 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990).
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[To hold otherwise] would bid fair to convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort re-
tained by the States.1 3'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas noted the many inconsis-
tencies in the substantial effects test and singled out the aggregation
principle for special criticism. In his view, under this principle,
Congress can regulate whole categories of activities that are not them-
selves either "interstate" or "commerce." In applying the [substantial] ef-
fects test, we ask whether the class of activities as a whole substantially af-
fects interstate commerce, not whether any specific activity within the
class has such effects when considered in isolation.
The aggregation principle is clever, but has no stopping point....
[O]ne always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that,
when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on com-
132merce.
In United States v. Morrison,13 the Court struck down the civil rem-
edy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 34 specifi-
cally rejecting Congress's reliance on the aggregation principle to es-
tablish a substantial effect on interstate commerce. According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, it is unworkable to extrapolate a "but-for
causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime... to every
attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If accepted, [this] rea-
soning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the na-
tionwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on
employment, production, transit, or consumption.'3 5
Various Justices in Lopez and Morrison implicitly relied on the
framework of competitive federalism as a basis for resolving the bal-
ance of dual sovereignty. In Lopez, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
emphasized the importance of political innovation:
While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person,
would argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school
premises, considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish
that goal. In this circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism
are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories for ex-
perimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far
from clear.
If a State or municipality determines that harsh criminal sanctions
are necessary and wise to deter students from carrying guns on school
premises, the reserved powers of the States are sufficient to enact those
151 Id. at 567.
12 Id. at 600 (citation omitted).
13 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
134 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13,701)
135 Id. at 615.
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measures. Indeed, over 40 States already have criminal laws outlawing
the possession of firearms on or near school grounds. 1
6
More recently, in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,37 the Court struck down the Corps' regulation of "isolated
wetlands" pursuant to the Migratory Bird Rule. 18 In the majority's
view, the rulemaking authority Congress granted to the Corps under
the Clean Water Act 3 9 lacked the clear expression of congressional
intent to encroach on the traditional state police powers necessary to
support the Migratory Bird Rule. Notable in this decision is Justice
Stevens's dissent, joined by three otherJustices, which makes a strong
theoretical case for competitive federalism as a basis for federal regu-
lation:
[T] he migratory bird rule does not blur the "distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local." Justice Holmes cogently observed
in Missouri v. Holland that the protection of migratory birds is a textbook
example of a national problem. The destruction of aquatic migratory
bird habitat, like so many other environmental problems, is an action in
which the benefits (e.g., a new landfill) are disproportionately local, while
many of the costs (e.g., fewer migratory birds) are widely dispersed and
often borne by citizens living in other States. In such situations, de-
scribed by economists as involving "externalities," federal regulation is
both appropriate and necessary.140
Nothing in this statement is inconsistent with the reasoning the ma-
jority used to arrive at its decision. It appears that the majority simply
considered migratory bird populations' use of isolated wetlands to be
so remote from Congress's purpose in passing the Act that the Corps'
adoption of the Migratory Bird Rule required a specific congressional
grant of rule making authority.
II. PRACTICAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
"Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare
prescription.'
Early on in the development of Sherman Act case law, the Court
groped for a clear standard by which to evaluate trade restraints.
Candidates included the "concern for small dealers and worthy men,"
the maintenance of reasonable prices, the maintenance of large
numbers of competitors, the fragmentation of markets, and the sup-
136 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (citations omitted).
137 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
13 51 Fed. Reg. 41,208, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
in Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
140 Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
141 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (quoting Reiter
v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)).
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pression of "great aggregations of capital. 14 2  The result was a con-
fused and often pernicious body of antitrust precedents. Antitrust
scholars and jurists now largely agree that the exclusive goal of the
Sherman Act and other antitrust laws is to promote "consumer wel-
fare," as most forcefully advanced by Robert Bork. 4  According to the
consumer welfare standard, business arrangements that create mar-
ket power invariably generate allocative inefficiency reflected in re-
duced output and higher prices to consumers.44 But they may also
generate offsetting productive efficiency by integrating operations
and lowering production costs, which tends to increase output and
lower prices. Consumer welfare is best served by prohibiting business
arrangements whose probable net effect is to reduce output and raise
prices; that is, to restrain trade.
Based on the consumer welfare standard, Bork rationalized the
use of a per se rule against "naked" horizontal restraints of trade such
as price fixing, proposed a market share test for horizontal mergers,
and persuasively argued that all vertical restraints should be subject to
a full evidentiary inquiry under the rule of reason. 4 5 As a result, the
case law has become clearer and more predictable, with the adoption
of an output test to distinguish per se restraints from those best ad-
dressed under a full reasonableness inquiry, a full reasonableness in-
quiry for vertical division of territories and vertical maximum retail
prices, and a virtual presumption that predatory pricing is economi-
cally irrational. Horizontal merger policy has evolved toward a worka-
ble set of market share tests for identifying the mergers antitrust
agencies can be expected to challenge for the likely exercise of mar-
ket power.
142 BORK, supra note 22, at 51 (describing standards noted by Justices Peckham and Hand).
143 See id. at 61 ("The legislative history of the Sherman Act... displays the clear and exclu-
sive policy intention of promoting consumer welfare.").
1 Even early on, the Court considered the enhancement of prices to be the primary evil to
which the Sherman Act was directed:
Without going into detail and but very briefly surveying the whole field, it may be
with accuracy said that the dread of enhancement of prices and of other wrongs which it
was thought would flow from the undue limitation on competitive conditions caused by
contracts or other acts of individuals or corporations, led, as a matter of public policy, to
the prohibition or treating as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably re-
strictive of competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the contract or
act or where the surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion that
they had not been entered into or performed with the legitimate purpose of reasonably
forwarding personal interest and developing trade, but on the contrary were of such a
character as to give rise to the inference or presumption that they had been entered into
or done with the intent to do wrong to the general public and to limit the right of indi-
viduals, thus restraining the free flow of commerce and tending to bring about the evils,
such as enhancement of prices, which were considered to be against public policy.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (White,J.).
145 See BORK, supra note 22, at 67 ("The per se rule against naked price fixing ... can be ex-
plained only by a preference for consumer welfare as the exclusive goal of antitrust.").
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Part II.A briefly describes the simple economics of market power.
Part II.B describes the practical analytical framework that antitrust
agencies use to identify the extent of the market for assessing the ef-
fect of horizontal mergers on market power. Part II.C briefly de-
scribes how this framework can be adapted to assess the scope of
price effects for the purpose of establishing federal jurisdiction under
the geographic market power test.
A. The Economics of Market Power
Consider an isolated island economy in which there are a large
number of consumers and 100 wealth-maximizing widget firms, all of
whom face the same production technology and therefore operate at
the same scale."' For simplicity, assume that consumers believe there
are no close substitutes for widgets and that any transaction costs con-
sumers would ordinarily face in arbitraging the price of widgets
across firms are zero. Under these circumstances, the "representa-
tive" firm shown in Figure 1 illustrates a competitive widget market in
which no firm is able to exercise market power and resources are al-
located efficiently. DR reflects this firm's pro rata share of total market
demand for widgets and MC reflects its marginal cost of producing
widgets. DR slopes down because the value consumers place on addi-
tional widgets declines as their consumption rate rises. MC slopes up
because the value of the resources taken from other sectors of the
economy to produce widgets increases as the rate of widget produc-
tion rises. 147 The intersection of DR and MC determines the equilib-
rium market price, P*, and the representative firm's rate of produc-
tion, Q*.
Because the marginal value consumers place on widgets is exactly
equal to the marginal cost of widget production, this equilibrium
achieves allocative efficiency in the sense that it maximizes the sur-
plus value of widget production. The representative firm collects
P*Q* revenue from consumers and earns producer surplus equal to
area DFI, while consumers earn a surplus equal to area DFA.14 8 There
is no way to reallocate resources to improve one party's welfare with-
out reducing another party's welfare by a greater amount.
1 The persistence of 100 equal-size firms requires diseconomies of scale for any firm that
attempts to expand production beyond its current scale.
147 We assume there are no spillovers or externalities in either consumption or production,
so that DRand MC reflect all social costs and benefits.
148 Producer surplus is defined as total revenue, P*Q*, minus the area under MC up to Q*,
while consumer surplus is defined as the area under DR up to Q* minus total expenditures,
P*Q*.
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FIGURE 1: MARKET POWER
$/Widget
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MC
D* = MR*
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QQ, Widgets/month
It is important to understand that DR is not the demand curve
perceived by the representative firm if it considers adjusting its rate of
output unilaterally. Rather, DR indicates its pro rata share of total
market sales to consumers if all firms charge the same price. If the
price of inputs critical to the widget production process were to de-
cline, for example, MC would shift down and its intersection with DR
would accurately describe the resulting equilibrium for the represen-
tative firm. All firms would increase their production rate and de-
crease price identically because consumers would stand ready to arbi-
trage any price differences between firms. If any single firm
unilaterally lowers price even slightly below P*, consumers would re-
act by offering to shift all their purchases to it. However, since the
firm can sell as many widgets as it wants at P*, it has no incentive to
lower price. Alternatively, consumers would react decisively to even a
modest increase in price above P* by a single firm, shifting all of their
purchases to the remaining ninety-nine firms and leaving the recalci-
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trant firm with zero sales. 149 Thus, if any single firm considers adjust-
ing price, while other firms maintain price at P*, it faces a demand
curve equal to D* that is horizontal, or perfectly elastic, at P*. Be-
cause the firm receives P* on every unit it sells, D* is coincident with
its marginal revenue curve, MR*. Recognizing it can have no influ-
ence on the market price by adjusting production, the firm takes the
competitive market price as given and is completely devoid of market
power.
It is fairly easy to see the effects of market power by hypothesizing
that the island's widget firms suddenly gain the ability to coordinate
production, either by colluding or by merging into a single firm. By
coordinating, they are able to exercise market power, which is simply
the ability to raise price above P* without experiencing a complete
loss of sales. Unlike the situation described above, the representative
firm now perceives a demand curve equal to DR. Since DR is down-
ward sloping, as the firm raises price it sells fewer widgets, but be-
cause consumers have imperfect substitutes for widgets they do not
reduce their purchases to zero. Under the standard assumption that
firms must charge a uniform price for all the widgets it sells, the rep-
resentative firm's marginal revenue is now shown by MRR.150  To
maximize wealth, the firm reduces its rate of output to Q, where MRR
intersects MC, and then charges the highest possible uniform price at
which all Q, widgets can be sold. This occurs at Pc. The motivation
for exercising market power is that it may increase the firm's total
surplus, now equal to total revenue (PcQ,) minus the area under MC
up to Q. This corresponds to area BCHI.1
5
1
The problem with market power is not specifically that it allows
colluding widget firms to earn additional profits, but that it allows
them to earn additional profits by reducing output below Q*, which
leads to allocative inefficiency. At the lower production rate of Q ,
the value consumers place on the marginal widget increases to P,
while the cost of the marginal widget in terms of the value of re-
sources forgone in production falls to MC,. The difference is what
Frank Easterbrook has characterized as the "monopoly overcharge. '"' 5'
Too few widgets are produced, too few resources are devoted to wid-
get production, and too many resources are devoted to non-widget
sectors of the economy where they provide a smaller surplus. Con-
149 This assumes the diseconomies of scale experienced by the remaining firms from expand-
ing output by (1/99) x Q times their share of the recalcitrant firm's normal sales are trivial.
Otherwise, as production costs increase, the equilibrium market price must rise. This effect is
relevant to our discussion of geographic market power, infta Part II.B.
150 The uniform pricing constraint essentially assumes away price discrimination.
151 The exercise of market power increases the firm's total surplus if area BCED exceeds area
EFH.
152 Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 39.
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sumers would have valued the production that has been lost equal to
the area under DR from Q* to Q, while the costs saved are equal only
to the area under MC between these two points. In total, the island
economy loses consumer and producer surplus equal to area CFH,
often characterized as the "deadweight loss due to monopoly" or
simply as the "welfare triangle."' 53 Unlike the situation depicted
above in which widget firms are unable to coordinate, resources can
now be reallocated to improve the parties' net welfare. This is exactly
what the Sherman Act is designed to achieve under the consumer
welfare standard.
The exercise of market power under these circumstances is a text-
book example of a market failure, in which the decision maker-the
organization of colluding firms-is unable to capture the full benefit
from expanding output because some of the benefit spills over to
consumers. This is because the private benefit to colluding firms, re-
flected by MRR, declines more rapidly as production rises than the so-
cial benefit to consumers, reflected by DR. The market failure is a di-
rect result of the requirement that the cartel charge a uniform price
for all the widgets it sells. Starting at any arbitrary price and produc-
tion rate along DR in Figure 1, to increase sales under the uniform
price constraint the cartel must reduce price on the additional wid-
gets it wants to sell and on the widgets it would have sold absent the
price reduction. The price reduction on these intramarginal widgets
spills over to consumers, who otherwise would have purchased them
at the higher price. The firm naturally fails to consider the spillover
in determining its wealth-maximizing rate of production; it produces
too little because it is unable to realize the full value of production as
revenue, hence the market failure.
Many of the trade restraints addressed by the Sherman Act arise
from horizontal arrangements between firms that would otherwise act
as rivals. Horizontal arrangements involving no integration of pro-
ductive activity are considered the most likely to result in the exercise
of market power. The most obvious example is collusive agreements
between independent firms to restrict production and raise prices.
Horizontal division of territories or customer allocations between in-
dependent firms can have the same effect on production and prices.
These are thought to be the most serious types of horizontal trade re-
153 BORK, supra note 22; Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON.
REV. 77 (1954). Note that consumer surplus declines by the difference between area DFA and
area BCA. Of this difference, recall that BCED is transferred to producers. In certain circum-
stances, producers may dissipate some or all of this value in an effort to effect the transfer.
These losses, which result from productive inefficiency, must be added to the deadweight loss
for some purposes. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11
(1976) (describing the loss to society when consumers continue to purchase products at mo-
nopoly prices).
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straints because the participating firms remain independent. As a re-
sult, they are treated as unreasonable per se in the antitrust case law.1
4
Horizontal mergers between competing firms can also lead to re-
duced output and increased prices, but given that the participating
firms integrate their productive activities, antitrust economists believe
any resulting allocative inefficiency may be offset by productive effi-
ciencies that allow the new firm to cut production costs and possibly
prices. These types of restraints are evaluated with a full evidentiary
inquiry into their reasonableness.
B. Market Definition and Market Power
As Justice Scalia noted in his Summit dissent, antitrust analysis re-
quires the definition of an appropriate market.5 6 The foregoing
model can be used as the basis for identifying the extent of the mar-
ket and assessing the likely effect of trade restraints on market power.
It is important to keep in mind that there is no theoretically "correct"
market in any given setting; the broader the market is defined, all
else being equal, the smaller the combined market share of a specific
group of coordinating firms and the less likely their restraint is to
create market power. There are two dimensions to any market defi-
nition: the relevant product and the relevant geographic scope. Be-
cause our ultimate concern is the proper limit of Sherman Act juris-
diction-an inherently spatial concern-our primary focus is on the
geographic scope of the market. Before proceeding, however, it is
necessary to briefly explain how to identify the relevant product.
In describing the widget market on our hypothetical island econ-
omy, we finessed the problem of defining the relevant product by as-
suming widgets have no close substitutes in consumers' perception.
In reality, if a group of firms raises the price of their product relative
to competing products, consumers are likely to substitute the low-
priced product for the high-priced product, thereby limiting the
firms' ability to sustain the price increase. Consumers' willingness to
substitute between alternatives in the face of a relative price change
determines the extent of the product market. In antitrust law, the
more closely two goods compete, the more likely they are to be con-
1 BORK, supra note 22, at 107-26.
155 For example, J.D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Trust led to dramatic reductions in the price
of kerosene and other petroleum products. DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF
ANTITRUST 77 (1972). See generally McGee, supra note 20. The same can be said for internal
growth to monopoly, as in the case of Alcoa or Microsoft. For a good exposition of how these
three cases are similar, see DAVID S. KOPEL, ANTITRUST AFTER MICROSOFT: THE OBSOLESCENCE
OF ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL ERA (2001).
15 Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 333 (1991).
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sidered in the same product market precisely because variations in
their relative prices will cause consumers to substitute between them.
It is fairly easy to imagine that widgets compete for consumers' fa-
vor with other products within a broader product category, just as
aluminum ingot competes with other metals, cellophane competes
with other flexible wrapping materials, and Brand X CD players com-
pete with other audio equipment such as FM radios, cassette players,
and DVD players. Naturally, the broader the product category the
less likely it is to have viable substitutes and the more likely a price in-
crease is to persist. In the face of an increase in the price of Brand X
CD players, consumers are very likely to find viable substitutes among
other brands of CD players and all other types of audio equipment.
In the face of an increase in the price of all brands of CD players,
however, consumers are far less likely to find viable substitutes among
all other types of audio equipment. How to identify suitably close
substitutes in practice is a question that must ultimately be answered
empirically. Based on cross-elasticities between substitute product
categories, economists can, in principle, identify the most narrowly
defined product category for which a price increase is likely to persist
if imposed by all sellers of that product. This product category iden-
tifies the relevant product market for antitrust purposes.
To determine whether a given restraint is likely to result in the
creation of market power we must also identify the relevant geo-
graphic market. The geographic scope of an economic market has
been defined as "that set of suppliers and demanders whose trading
establishes the price of a good... 'within which the price of a good
tends to uniformity, allowance being made for transportation
costs. ' 57 A workable empirical test for this definition is the similarity
of price movements within the market. But neither this definition,
nor its empirical counterpart, are especially useful in an antitrust set-
ting because they assume the events that cause prices to change are
beyond the discretion of market participants.15" By way of example, in
the island widget economy we hypothesized an exogenous economy-
wide decline in the price of inputs critical to the widget production
157 George J. Stigler & Robert A. Sherwin, The Extent of the Market, 28 J.L. & ECON. 555, 555
(1985) (quoting 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 325 (Variorum ed. 1961)); see
also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV.
937, 937 (1981) (stating that market power is the ability of a firm or group of firms to raise a
price above competitive levels without losing sales to the extent that it is unprofitable and the
new price needs to be rescinded). For an alternative method of defining markets in mergers
cases based on "marketing concepts," see Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Bounding Markets in Merger
Cases: Identifying Relevant Competitors, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 733 (1984).
15 See Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation
in Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45, 48 (1973) ("[P]rice data are of little use in geo-
graphic market delineation-at least for antimerger enforcement. ").
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process and found that arbitrage would cause all firms to increase
output and reduce price. In antitrust, however, the focus is on the
ability of a group of coordinating firms to restrict output and raise
price by restraining trade to market power. Since the island's eco-
nomic market had distinct limits due to its geographic isolation, a
hypothetical cartel of all widget firms was able to do this successfully.
What has been characterized as the "geographic antitrust market"
may be either broader or narrower than the economic market. The
accepted method of identifying the geographic antitrust market is the
"hypothetical monopolist test," which is formalized in the Merger
Guidelines and used by antitrust agencies to assess the probable ef-
fect of horizontal mergers on market power.'O According to this test,
for any pair of firms proposing to merge the antitrust market is de-
fined as the narrowest geographic area containing the merging firms
in which all firms in the area, by coordinating their operating deci-
sions, can profitably sustain a small but significant increase in the
price of the relevant product above what would prevail absent the re-
straint.l6
To show how this test works, we return to our isolated island
economy. For simplicity, assume the island is perfectly round and
that consumers and producers are evenly distributed within its bor-
ders, depicted by Circle E in Figure 2. We assume transportation
costs for all firms on the island increase at a constant rate with dis-
tance. We then consider a subgroup of firms that include the firms
proposing to merge, say those within Circle A, and ask whether, by
acting in concert, they can profitably sustain a small but significant
increase in the price of widgets. If not, then Circle A does not repre-
sent a geographic market for antitrust purposes because no single
firm or narrower subgroup of firms within Circle A could hope to sus-
tain a price increase if all the firms in Circle A acting together are
unable to do so. The geographic antitrust market is broader than
Circle A because outside firms must be added to the subgroup before
it can hope to exercise market power. Suppose we expand the sub-
group to include all firms in Circle B and again find that these firms
acting together are unable profitably to sustain a price increase. By
proceeding incrementally in this fashion, we can identify the narrow-
159 David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Geographic Market Definition Under the US. Depart-
ment ofJustice Merger Guidelines, 30J.L. & ECON. 123 (1987) (discussing antitrust markets versus
economic markets).
160 Other empirical tests for identifying the antitrust market can be found in HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw §§ 3.2-3.6, at 59-77 (1985), and Greg-
oryJ. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REv. 123 (1992).
161 See Scheffman & Spiller, supra note 159, at 125-26 (discussing the Merger Guidelines'
definition of antitrust markets).
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est geographic market in which the associated firms are capable of
exercising market power. Suppose this coincides with Circle C.
FIGURE 2: HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST TEST
The geographic antitrust market, depicted in Circle C, may be
narrower than the entire island economy. For this to be true, the
firms outside Circle C must have sufficiently limited productive ca-
pacity such that they are unable to expand output enough to com-
pletely undermine the cartel. With the higher price set by the firms
inside Circle C, outside firms will attempt to arbitrage the price dif-
ference by expanding their production and selling into the colluders'
market. As they do so, they will succeed in taking a portion of sales
away from the colluders, but their marginal production costs will
eventually increase so much that they will no longer be willink to ex-
pand. The resulting hypothetical equilibrium is one in which prices
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throughout the island economy are higher than they would be absent
the colluders' exercise of market power, with any price differences
reflecting transportation costs. This condition confirms that the en-
tire island is an economic market even though the antitrust market is
narrower.
There is nothing in this analysis that requires us to start the hypo-
thetical monopolist test with Circle A. Quite the contrary; in the con-
text of a real merger proposal the antitrust agencies begin with the
narrowest geographic area that includes the merging firms, and, of
course, they recognize that consumers are not uniformly distributed
across space and that transportation costs can vary for many reasons.
If, using the hypothetical monopolist test, the agencies find that these
firms would be unable profitably to sustain a small price increase,
they search for the narrowest geographic area that includes the next-
best substitute for production at the merging firms' location and ask
whether all firms in this area acting together could do so.
Having identified the geographic antitrust market in this way, the
antitrust agencies attempt to determine whether a merger, presuma-
bly between only two firms, is likely to generate market power absent
the cooperation of the nonmerging firms. Obviously, the smaller the
merging firms' combined share of the geographic antitrust market
the less likely they are to possess market power given that a hypo-
thetical monopoly of all firms is just barely able to sustain a profitable
price increase. The agencies account for market shares by calculating
the share of production attributable to each firm in the market. They
then calculate the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") for the mar-
ket by summing the firms' squared market shares.162 For example, if
the market contains five firms, each of which have market share of
20%, the HHI for the market is (.22) + (.22) + (.22) + (.22) + (.22) = .2, or
2000 by convention. The HHI gives proportionately greater weight to
the market shares of the larger firms, reflecting the belief that a
firm's influence in coordinating production in the market is more
than proportionate to its market share. The antitrust agencies con-
sider an HHI below 1000 to reflect an unconcentrated market. An
HHI between 1000 and 1800 is said to be moderately concentrated,
and an HHI above 1800 is said to be concentrated. It is widely under-
stood, however, that these thresholds are imprecise and somewhat
arbitrary indicators of market power.
162 The Hirfindahl-Hirschman index ("HHI") is the sum of the squares of the market share
of each firm in the relevant market. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 12.4a2, at 512 (1999); KEITH HYLTON, ANTITRUST
LAW: ECONOMic THEORY & COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 328 (2003); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAw 70 (2001).
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The agencies' starting point for analysis of a given merger is to
identify the defendants' geographic antitrust market, calculate the
HHI, and then calculate the change in the HHI that would result
from the proposed merger. As already explained, the resulting calcu-
lation is imprecise because, among other reasons, the effect of the
merger on the defendants' combined market share will depend criti-
cally on the extent to which the merger generates productive effi-
ciencies. A merger that generates few productive efficiencies while
creating market power in the geographic antitrust market is likely to
reduce the defendants' combined market share over time, while a
merger that generates substantial productive efficiencies while creat-
ing little market power is likely to increase the defendants' combined
market share over time.
For unconcentrated markets, the agencies presume little or no ef-
fect of the merger on the HHI. For markets whose post-merger HHI
is between 1000 and 1800, the agencies presume a merger that in-
creases HHI by less than 100 is unlikely to create market power, while
a merger that increases HHI by more than 100 raises significant con-
cerns over the creation of market power. For markets in which the
HHI exceeds 1800 the agencies presume a merger that increases HHI
by less than 50 is unlikely to create market power, while a merger that
increases HHI by more than 50 raises significant concerns over the
creation of market power. Where the post-merger HHI exceeds
1800, the agencies presume that mergers producing an increase in
the HHI of more than 100 points are likely to create or enhance
market power or facilitate its exercise.
163
It is important to understand that the antitrust agencies face a
tradeoff in identifying the geographic antitrust market. The wider
the product and geographic market to which they apply the hypo-
thetical monopolist test, the more likely it is that a hypothetical mo-
nopolist would be able to exercise market power in that market.
However, by increasing the scope of the market in this way, they nec-
essarily reduce the combined market share of the firms proposing to
merge. Presumably, the agencies' recognition of this tradeoff at least
partly explains why they identify the geographic antitrust market as
the narrowest market in which a hypothetical monopolist could prof-
itably sustain an increase in price. 64 In practice, the agencies use
market share thresholds established under the Merger Guidelines 5
163 For example, if two firms in an antitrust market of five equal-sized firms were to merge,
the HHI would increase from 2000 to 2800. If two firms in an antitrust market of ten equal-
sized firms were to merge, the HHI would increase from 1000 to 1200.
1 Another rationale for choosing the narrowest market is that it leads to a standard basis for
comparison across cases.
16 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992).
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as crude proxies for the creation and probable exercise of market
power, and the exact magnitude of the thresholds can therefore be
adjusted to reflect the choice of the narrowest market. Federal courts
are not bound by the Merger Guidelines,'" but nevertheless many
federal courts follow their approach to product and geographic mar-
ket definition. 67 This is because the Merger Guidelines "represent
mainstream economic thinking," and are functionally equivalent to
other tests that the courts have developed 
over the years.
C. Adapting the Guidelines to the Issue ofJurisdiction
Rather than focusing on the geographic scope of the price in-
crease resulting from a given horizontal merger, the Merger Guide-
lines focus solely on whether the merger is likely to generate market
power. To be useful in the context of a jurisdictional challenge, it is
therefore necessary to adapt the Merger Guidelines' underlying logic
to assess the geographic scope of price effects resulting from market
power. For example, the geographic antitrust market, as defined ac-
cording to the hypothetical monopolist test, is likely to overlap one or
more economic markets, "within which the price of a good tends to
uniformity, allowance being made for transportation costs." 69 An ex-
ercise of market power will cause a flow of goods into the geographic
antitrust market as outside firms expand production in an attempt to
arbitrage price differences within these overlapping economic mar-
kets. To some extent, prices will therefore rise outside the geo-
graphic antitrust market, possibly spilling over to neighboring states.
Unless the defendants' combined share of the geographic antitrust
market is 100%, however, any such spillovers are less likely to occur.
In defining the relevant market for antitrust jurisdiction, a proper
test should formally recognize the tradeoff between the likelihood of
interstate price spillovers and the likelihood that the defendants can
effectively exercise market power within the geographic antitrust
market as defined.
16 See FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("We note that the
Department of Justice Guidelines offer a useful illustration of the application of the HHI, but
are by no means to be considered binding on the court.").
167 See, e.g., Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 n.6 (W.D. Ark.
1995) (discussing how the Merger Guidelines do not have "the force of law" but are still cited
quite often), affd sub nom. Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. DR Partners, 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
168 Id.
16 Stigler & Sherwin, supra note 157, at 555.
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III. THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET POWER TEST FOR
SHERMAN ACTJURISDICTION
If two children operating competing lemonade stands decided to fix prices,
the effect on interstate commerce would be trivial .... 170
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution states that the federal
courts have the power to adjudicate only "cases" or "controversies"
"arising under" the Constitution and the "Laws of the United
States. 17 ' This passage establishes an important limitation on federal
court jurisdiction that goes to the very heart of sovereignty. If a case
or controversy does not arise under the Constitution or a federal stat-
ute, federal courts lack jurisdiction over the subject matter. "The re-
quirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter
'springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the
United States' and is 'inflexible and without exception. 17 ' Because
the federal judicial power is limited, it is well settled that parties seek-
ing redress in federal court must allege the facts necessary to support
subject matter jurisdiction, and the court is free at any time during
the proceedings to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction when the necessary
facts come to light. In principle, the defendant has the right to rebut
these allegations by presenting contrary evidence. 7  If the party as-
serting federal jurisdiction, for example a civil plaintiff suing under
Section I of the Sherman Act for treble damages, is unable to provide
substantial evidence to overcome the defendants' rebuttal, the de-
fendants can move to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 7 4 for failure of subject matter jurisdiction,
which thereby will be defeated.
7 5
170 Hammes v. AAMCO Transmission, 33 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.).
171 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
172 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (Scalia, J.) (quoting
Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
173 As Justice Burger stated in McLain:
To establish jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege the critical relationship in the pleadings
and if these allegations are controverted must proceed to demonstrate by submission of
evidence beyond the pleadings either that the defendants' activity is itself in interstate
commerce or, if it is local in nature, that it has an effect on some other appreciable activ-
ity demonstrably in interstate commerce.
McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
174 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1).
175 Prior to Summit, the lower courts were split on whether the Sherman Act's language
"among the several states" was a 12(b) (1) jurisdictional issue or a 12(b) (6) failure to state a
claim issue. Compare McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 583 F.2d 1315, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding
that dismissal should be based on lack of jurisdiction, i.e., a 12(b)(1) motion, and not a
12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim), overruled on other grounds by 444 U.S. 232 (1980),
with Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1171-73 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (holding that failure to allege an effect on interstate commerce is a failure to state a
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To establish Sherman Act jurisdiction under the geographic mar-
ket power test, the plaintiff must allege that the defendants engaged
in a restraint of trade that generated (or if successful would be rea-
sonably likely to generate) market power that caused prices to rise in
more states than one. More particularly, the complainant must allege
that (1) the defendants supplied a particular product; (2) the defen-
dants engaged in a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade for the sale of that product; (3) the geographic antitrust mar-
ket for the defendant's product was sufficiently large that a hypo-
thetical monopolist could plausibly affect prices in more states than
one; and (4) the defendants' activity generated sufficient market
power within the geographic antitrust market to restrain trade and
raise prices. As under the Merger Guidelines, market concentration
could be expressed in terms of the HHI, and the likelihood that the
restraint, if successful, would generate market power could be based
claim and not a failure to allege subject matter jurisdiction, and should be dealt with as a
12(b)(6) motion).
We feel that it is a 12(b) (1) matter for three reasons. First, subject matter jurisdiction is
concerned with the power of the court to hear the case in the first place and is clearly regarded
as a threshold issue. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 88, 94. The language "among the several states" was
essential to establish Congress's authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause and, there-
fore, the court needs to inquire into whether the alleged restraint could plausibly affect inter-
state commerce before hearing the merits of the claim. Second, in practice, a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under 12(b) (6) takes the pleadings of the plaintiff's complaint as
true, and no external inquiry is allowed into the factual allegations (otherwise it becomes a mo-
tion for summary judgment). E.g., Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 288 F.3d 548, 560
(3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court's consideration of evidence outside the complaint
did not convert defendant's 12(b) (6) motion into a motion for summaryjudgment).
As a general rule, the court may only consider the pleading which is attacked by an
FRCP 12(b)(6) motion in determining its sufficiency.... The court is not permitted to
look at matters outside the record; if such matters are considered, the FRCP 12(b) (6)
motion to dismiss is, by the express terms of FRCP 12(b), converted into a motion for
summary judgment.
Id. (quoting FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S EDITION § 62.508). Under the rules of notice
pleading, the plaintiff can establish jurisdiction for the time being by properly pleading the
facts in good faith, even if they are later controverted. The court should be permitted to hear
defendants' offer of proof regarding the validity of the pleadings, just as it might if a case was
brought under diversity jurisdiction and the parties were citizens of the same state. Finally,
dismissal on grounds ofjurisdiction usually does not have resjudicata effects, and this will allow
the plaintiff to pursue his claims in state court, if possible. See Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d
606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[D]ismissal on jurisdictional grounds alone is not on the merits and
permits the plaintiff to pursue his claim in the same or in another forum."); Wagner v. Magel-
lan Health Servs., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 673, 683 (N.D. I11. 2000) (dismissing state law claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction without prejudice so as to allow the plaintiff to pursue them
in the state forum). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, usually result in the
plaintiff being given leave to amend, and the plaintiff will then allege facts, irrefutable at the
pleadings stage, to establish jurisdiction. See id. at 673 (granting plaintiff leave to amend his
pleadings to reallege RICO predicate acts after dismissing plaintiff's antitrust claims). But in
principle, the defendants have the right to rebut the plaintiff's factual allegations regarding
jurisdiction.
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on the associated change in HHI from combining the defendants'
market shares." 6
In essence, the above procedures for establishing jurisdiction un-
der the Act require the party asserting jurisdiction to allege a substan-
tive nexus between the prohibited restraint and the interstate spill-
over that provides the foundation for federal jurisdiction. Chief
Justice Burger rejected this approach in McLain, because he thought
it would require the plaintiff to establish its entire substantive claim at
the jurisdictional stage.' Justice Scalia correctly pointed out in his
Summit dissent that Burger was mistaken because the Court was free
to assume the success of the conspiracy and to evaluate the jurisdic-
tional question accordingly. 178 Under the geographic market power
test, a conspiracy to fix prices might be locally successful and yet the
defendants' share of an interstate geographic antitrust market might
be so small that the conspiracy could not plausibly be alleged to raise
prices outside the state. Alternatively, the plaintiff might prevail on
the jurisdictional question but ultimately fail on the merits by being
unable to prove the existence of a conspiracy. Thus, proof of the
conspiracy and its actual effects are invariably preserved for a trial on
the merits.
The geographic market power test imposes an economically ap-
propriate tradeoff on the plaintiff when alleging jurisdiction under
the Act. The narrower the market the plaintiff alleges, the more
likely a restraint by the defendants will generate market power. The
narrower the market, however, the less likely a hypothetical monopo-
list could increase prices outside the state. Plaintiffs will naturally
want to allege the narrowest market consistent with the plausible al-
legation of interstate price spillovers because this maximizes the de-
fendants' measured share of the market, the HHI, and the resulting
change in the HHI. The defendants can respond by offering to
prove they have such a small share of the market that any exercise of
market power is economically implausible. Alternatively, they can of-
fer to prove that the geographic antitrust market alleged by the plain-
tiff is so narrow even a hypothetical monopolist would be unlikely to
sustain a profitable price increase that substantially spilled across
state lines. On either showing, the defendants' conduct would be
presumptively intrastate and, unless rebutted by the plaintiff, would
be sufficient to support a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
One of the attractive attributes of the geographic market power
test is that it imposes a tradeoff on the plaintiff's reliance on vertical
176 Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,554 § 1.1 (Sept. 10, 1992).
177 McLain, 444 U.S. at 243.
178 Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 335 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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aggregation without strictly preventing it, thereby providing the
plaintiff with the flexibility to define the market according to the facts
at its disposal and the circumstances of the particular restraint at is-
sue. This is because defining the product category broadly to include
vertically-related goods or services raises the plaintiffs evidentiary
burden regarding the defendants' HHI and change-in-HHI. As in
McLain, for example, the plaintiffs would be free to allege a relatively
broad product category that includes complements to real estate bro-
kerage such as financing and title insurance.'79 Although unlikely, it
is economically possible that fixed minimum brokerage fees in the
greater New Orleans area would cause such a dramatic decline in the
number of real estate transactions that the price of financing and title
insurance outside the state would substantially decline, possibly sup-
porting a Sherman Act claim by lenders or title insurers. Including
financing and title insurance in the product definition increases the
likelihood that a hypothetical monopoly of the broad product cate-
gory in the greater New Orleans area would have substantial inter-
state price effects. At the same time, however, by reducing the de-
fendants' combined market share, it raises the plaintiff's burden of
demonstrating that their restraint could plausibly have such an ef-
fect. 89 In any event, under the geographic market power test the
likely interstate scope of price effects is a question of fact that
Sherman Act defendants have a threshold right to resolve as a juris-
dictional matter.
The tradeoff imposed by the geographic market power test has
similar implications for horizontal aggregation. The plaintiff is free
to allege a geographic antitrust market sufficiently broad that a hypo-
thetical monopolist would be extremely likely to sustain a profitable
increase in prices outside the state in question. However, defining
the market broadly raises the plaintiffs jurisdictional burden else-
where. In Mandeville Island Farms, for example, the Court hypothe-
sized that the effect on interstate commerce would be substantial if all
sugar refiners in the country adopted the same grower contracts as
the defendant."" In essence, the Court applied the hypothetical mo-
nopolist test to the national market and concluded that interstate
sugar prices would thereby suffer a substantial effect. But the Court
179 McLain, 444 U.S. at 235.
180 Similarly, as in Summit, the plaintiff would be free to allege that the relevant product cate-
gory includes an entire collection of vertically-related activities associated with general hospital
services and that the relevant geographic antitrust market is the entire Los Angeles area. Sum-
mit, 500 U.S. at 324-25, 332-33. A hypothetical monopoly in such a broadly defined market
might well cause the price of eye surgery to increase in neighboring states, but the exclusion of
a single eye surgeon, or even a general firm policy of excluding surgeons from the market un-
der prescribed circumstances would be extremely unlikely to generate market power.
181 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
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neglected to recognize that the refiners' share of such a broadly de-
fined geographic antitrust market was absolutely trivial and beyond
any plausible suggestion of market power. Whereas such uncon-
strained aggregation may be appropriate to establish constitutional
jurisdiction in cases such as Wickard, where Congress has made spe-
cific findings as to the need for federal regulation, it is inappropriate
to establish jurisdiction under general prohibitions such as the
Sherman Act that require "a particularized judicial determination
" 1a2
in light of the circumstances at hand and the underlying goal of the
statute .
Note that the geographic market power test in no way recognizes
formalistic distinctions. Applied to the facts in E.C. Knight, for exam-
ple, the geographic market power test would surely have found that
the defendants' "manufacturing" operations caused sugar prices to
rise in more states than one. Thus, the Court in Standard Oit 4 was
correct in rejecting E.C. Knight.85 Neither does the geographic mar-
ket power test rely on the distinction between "direct" and "indirect"
effects, although it will ordinarily give effects that are economically
remote from the defendants' restraint limited weight in the jurisdic-
tional calculus. Moreover, whether the defendants' goods are in the
stream of commerce is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
to establish federal jurisdiction. An effective restraint by firms whose
sales are entirely within their home state may cause prices to increase
outside the state even though the defendants' goods never cross state
lines. Indeed, the likely effect of such a restraint would be to increase
the flow of competitors' goods into the state and reduce the flow, if
any, of the defendants' goods out of the state. Alternatively, the de-
fendants may sell their goods in a national market in which they have
absolutely no hope of affecting prices, even though they have market
power in their local intrastate market. The sole question relevant to
Sherman Act jurisdiction is whether the alleged restraint affects
prices outside any state in which the restraint operates.
A second attractive feature of the geographic market power test is
that it need not be applied identically to all restraints. No jurisdic-
tional test can be expected to perform without error, but the geo-
graphic market power test establishes a substantively reasoned basis
for Sherman Act jurisdiction that allows the legal system to iterate to-
ward an articulate set of presumptions that minimize the weighted
182 Summit, 500 U.S. at 334 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
183 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
184 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
185 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
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sum of Type I and Type II errors. s6 In the context of antitrust, judi-
cial measurement error is small enough that practical market share
thresholds for HHI and changes in HHI can be established for vari-
ous categories of restraints. Below these thresholds the exercise of
market power is economically implausible and presumptively beyond
federal jurisdiction. Different restraints would very likely be subject
to different presumptions regarding the thresholds necessary for the
plaintiff to make out a prima facie case for federal jurisdiction. In all
cases, determination of the appropriate threshold would properly be
tempered by the courts' recognition that the category of alleged re-
straints may, in fact, generate productive efficiencies that more than
offset any associated allocative inefficiencies. Obvious horizontal
pricing arrangements would no doubt be subject to a very low
threshold, possibly approaching zero, as is currently the case, because
it is relatively unlikely that such arrangements can generate offsetting
productive efficiencies. Vertical price fixing and horizontal nonprice
restraints might be subject to marginally higher thresholds because
the likelihood that they can generate productive efficiencies is some-
what greater. Of course, the antitrust agencies would face a jurisdic-
tional constraint in assessing purely local horizontal mergers that
have thus far been formally absent.
IV. COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM, STATUTORY INTENT,
AND PRACTICAL BENEFITS
The greatest threat to consumers' welfare is not states, and their
competition, but a uniform national regimen that stifles the power of exit-
that is, a monopoly of lawmaking. 1
7
This section outlines the normative case in support of the geo-
graphic market power test. We show that it is consistent with the
framework of competitive federalism and with the statutory intent
behind the Sherman Act. We also show that it would resolve ongoing
confusion in the lower federal courts and lead to more rapid evolu-
tion of substantive rules as the result of political competition over op-
timal antitrust policy.
186 Type I errors, false positives, can be seen as situations in which the court allows jurisdic-
tion over defendants whose activities later prove on the merits to have no interstate price effect.
Type II errors, false negatives, can be seen as situations in which the court denies jurisdiction to
plaintiffs whose claims would prove on the merits to have a substantive interstate effect on inter-
state commerce.
187 Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 50.
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A. Competitive Federalism
The theoretical foundation for competitive federalism derives
from Charles Tiebout's pioneering 1956 essay, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures.'8 Tiebout was concerned with analyzing the municipal
supply of local public goods, such as roads, schools, and police and
fire services. 89 In the face of literature concluding that the only
mechanism for the provision of public goods was the ballot box, Tie-
bout demonstrated that a quasi-market mechanism could also work.' 90
As long as consumers of local public goods have a large number of
municipalities in which they can locate and are mobile and fully
aware of the different patterns of taxation, expenditures, and levels of
services provided by each municipality, then they can "vote with their
feet" by exiting one municipality and relocating in a more hospitable
one. Thus, while voting may dictate what level of services a munici-
pality provides, competition among municipalities ensures that con-
sumers will migrate to the municipality whose services match their
preferences for public good provision and taxation. The normative
implication is that to ensure all consumers receive the services they
desire at the lowest cost, the size and scope of government should be
kept small to promote political competition.'9'
The Tiebout model has been extended to analyze the govern-
ment's provision of a host of public goods, 19'2 including law itself.
Laws are a form of public good because once a court has established
a given precedent, one person's reliance on it does not diminish oth-
ers' ability to so rely. As with the provision of other public goods, the
citizenry is best served if the provision of law is subject to political or
inter-jurisdictional competition between local providers, at least to
the extent that the effects of the law are confined to the jurisdiction.
While the effects of some laws are strictly local and the effects of
other laws national, Tiebout's vision for the provision of public goods
can be achieved through a federal system in which the states and the
188 Tiebout, supra note 12.
189 Public goods are those whose consumption by one person does not diminish others' abil-
ity to consume the good. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954) (defining "collective consumption goods" and distinguishing
them from "private consumption goods").
190 Tiebout was responding to the literature at the time that suggested that there could be no
market mechanism for the provision of public goods, and that a political solution was the only
solution.
191 Tiebout noted that until the 1930s expenditures by municipalities far exceeded expendi-
tures by the federal government, and even in the 1950s when he wrote the article, federal ex-
penditures net of defense spending were less than municipal expenditures. Tiebout, supra note
12, at 418.
192 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 34-35 (arguing that competition to avoid exit
causes a strong tendency toward optimal legislation if certain conditions are satisfied, and using
state competition for corporate charters as an example).
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federal government have credible legislative and judicial powers, and
healthy political competition maintains the balance of sovereignty.
The geographic market power test applies the framework of com-
petitive federalism to the specific context of antitrust. The sole con-
cern for Sherman Act jurisdiction under this test is whether the de-
fendants' conduct in one state creates market power that spills across
state lines in the form of higher prices. For those trade restraints
whose price effects are confined to the defendants' home state, that
state's antitrust regulators have sufficient incentive and resources to
adequately address the problem. Political competition between states
will result in optimal, though not necessarily uniform, antitrust policy
with due regard for experimentation to address novel business prac-
tices tailored to local conditions.
When firms restrain trade in their home state unchallenged by
home-state antitrust regulators and the price effects of market power
spill across state lines, the citizens of neighboring states bear a por-
tion of the losses. If the restraining firms are careful to keep their
capital out of the neighboring state, there is little that the neighbor-
ing state's antitrust regulators can do to address the problem. With
citizens of the home state bearing less than the full cost of the re-
straint, while receiving one hundred percent of the benefits (assum-
ing the owners of the restraining firms are citizens of the home state),
the state's antitrust regulators are unlikely to pursue antitrust policy
with the same zeal as in the absence of a spillover. Federal antitrust
regulation is warranted only in these cases.
The alternative view is that antitrust regulation is subject to such
dramatic scale economies that unlimited federal authority is over-
whelmingly efficient. This view could apply either to legal admini-
stration or to the stock of legal precedents itself. The geographic
market power test in no way hinders the realization of scale econo-
mies in lawmaking. Because law is a public good, under the geo-
graphic market power test states can easily capture any scale econo-
mies attributable to federal lawmaking at no cost to the federal
system simply by adopting federal rules to cover their purely internal
activity if they so choose. Conversely, federal courts are free to rely
on state court decisions covering novel questions of law or fact purely
internal to the state. The geographic market power test in no way in-
hibits the inter-jurisdictional sharing of legal rules. Any state that
chooses to adopt novel rules is either acting foolishly, in which case it
will suffer from competition by other states, or it is acting properly in
the interest of its own citizens as local consumers of law.
If the scale economies argument does not apply to lawmaking, it
can only be based on scale economies in legal administration. But
the claim that federal regulators or courts should have unlimited au-
thority over the legal administration of all trade restraints amounts to
a rejection of any kind of federalism whatsoever. In an area of law
[Vol. 7:2
THE EVOLUTION OFSHERMANACTJURISDICTION
whose primary concern is the suppression of economic market
power, it is anomalous to suggest that political market power reposed
exclusively in the hands of the federal government is in the long run
best interests of the citizenry. A monopoly of legal administration is
far more alarming than a monopoly of widget making.'93
B. Statutory Intent
According to the geographic market power test, the most impor-
tant question when deciphering the limit of Sherman Actjurisdiction
is whether the states are independently capable of addressing the de-
fendants' exercise of market power. 9  This test appears consistent
with the founders' intent including the Commerce Clause in the new
Constitution and with a substantial body of subsequent Commerce
Clause case law. It is widely recognized that the Commerce Clause
was necessary to prevent states from engaging in protracted trade
wars that stifled interstate commerce and undermined national pros-
perity. Trade wars are one form of interstate spillover in which the
state erecting the trade barrier receives the benefits while imposing
the costs on the citizens of other states. In this setting, the dormant
Commerce Clause was sufficient to address the most salient interstate
spillovers. However, this changed with industrialization, giving rise to
the affirmative Commerce Clause as a basis for federal regulation.
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, state governments tried
unsuccessfully to suppress the rise of business trusts and other hori-
zontal combinations such as the Sugar Trust,'95 the Cotton Oil
Trust,' 96 and J.D. Rockefeller's infamous Standard Oil Trust. 9 7 It was
widely believed at the time that only a federal statute could effectively
combat the trusts because of their ability to evade the reach of state
193 Note that the current system does not strictly give the federal government a monopoly
over antitrust enforcement because states are free to exercise their own limited antitrust policy.
At the very least, however, this subjects the citizenry to concurrent antitrust jurisdiction. The
existence of substantial differences between the application of federal and state antitrust law to
completely local activities risks imposing unnecessary legal uncertainty on the citizenry. If, for
example, a state was to permit certain horizontal pricing restraints in the face of federal per se
prohibition, it would no doubt face a preemption challenge. Thus, the federal government
currently has a virtual monopoly on antitrust lawmaking, except for noncommercial activity un-
der the state action doctrine. See infra Part V.
194 Note that an intermediate solution is an interstate compact subject to congressional bless-
ing, which would presumably apply where the particular circumstances facing a small handful
of states resulted in a spillover only as between them, such that congressional legislation aimed
at the national economy would be redundant or counterproductive. See Michael S. Greve, Com-
pacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. REV. 285, 369-70 (2003) (proposing a func-
tional constitutional approach to Compact Clause analysis).
195 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
196 Louisiana v. Am. Cotton Oil Trust, 3 So. 409 (La. 1888).
197 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
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regulators merely by re-incorporating in a friendly state.", Indeed,
Congress viewed Wabash's proscription of discrimination against in-
terstate commerce as a major impediment to the states' ability to con-
trol the trusts unilaterally, as the trusts' goods invariably moved in in-
terstate commerce. ' 99  This is the backdrop against which the
Sherman Antitrust Act was conceived and finally passed in 1890. The
legislative history of the bill clearly indicates that its proponents in-
tended the Act to reach the outer limits of federal power over inter-
state commerce200 although they considered that power limited to the
narrow confines of dual federalism as most recently expressed in
cases such as Wabash and Kidd."'o In the words of Senator Sherman,
the bill's primary sponsor,
[t]he purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of the United States to
apply the same remedies against combinations which injuriously affect
the interests of the United States that have been applied in the several
States to protect local interests....
... If the combination is confined to a State the State should apply
the remedy; if it is interstate and controls any production in many states,
202Congress must apply the remedy.
Those who criticize legislative intent as a guide to judicial decision
making may be correct that it is impossible to discern the intent of
any collective body, and that in any event the legislative intent behind
the Sherman Act is irrelevant given the inability of members of Con-
gress to foresee the dramatic changes that have taken place in the na-
tional economy and the scope of general federal commerce power. 20
198 See Gavil, supra note 17, at 658-60, 689-91 (discussing the background and legislative his-
tory of the Sherman Act).
99 See Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 41 n.40 (citing Wabash to illustrate the Court's refusal to
allow states to regulate goods that moved in interstate commerce during the late nineteenth
century).
200 See Little, supra note 52, at 164-65 & nn.9, 12 & 194 (noting that the Sherman Act, as
originally proposed, was to apply to all arrangements that prevented competition, and then was
later revamped to apply to restraints of "trade or commerce among the several States" in order
to allay Commerce Clause concerns); see also Gavil, supra note 17, at 693 & n.161 & 695 (noting
that Congress "has never volunteered that ... the Act [should be] read more narrowly than its
potential," and "has manifested its desire to endorse the Court's expansive reading of Sherman
Acturisdiction").
See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9J.L. & ECON. 7, 31-35
(1966) (discussing Congress's perception that its commerce power was limited to solely inter-
state commercial interstate activities); see also Epstein, supra note 64, at 1413 (noting Wabash's
role in the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission); Gavil, supra note 17, at 682 n.114
(same).
21 CONG. REc. 2456-57 (1890).
203 Easterbrook's view is that courts must resort to some substantive method for resolving the
balance of dual sovereignty, and competitive federalism provides a superior framework. Easter-
brook does not use the term "competitive federalism," but his notion of the "economics of fed-
eralism" is virtually identical. See Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 42 ("The economics of federal-
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Yet even conceding all this, there is a measure of durability in Senator
Sherman's statement as a manifestation of statutory intent. Whatever
Congress may or may not have foreseen when it passed the Act, it
clearly sought to resolve a political spillover between states that pre-
vented them from unilaterally regulating the trusts. For the purpose
of identifying the proper limits of Sherman Actjurisdiction today, it is
just as relevant to inquire into the nature and scope of this spillover
as it was in 1890. The most important change that has occurred in
antitrust policy since 1890 is the level of understanding among courts
and commentators about the economic effects of market power and
the proper objective of the Act. That the Court's evolving economic
understanding should lead it to revise the limits of Sherman Act ju-
risdiction to better account for the discernable scope of the underly-
ing political spillover would seem uncontroversial.2
C. Practical Benefits
Perhaps the most obvious general benefit of the geographic mar-
ket power test is that it reduces the problem of concurrent antitrust
enforcement. Subjecting all U.S. firms to federal enforcement by
both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission,
and to private civil actions in federal courts, is troublesome enough
without adding concurrent state enforcement. As to purely local re-
straints, the geographic market power test takes a first step toward
limiting concurrent enforcement. It is worth noting that increasing
globalization is fast reducing the relative size of the U.S. economy in
world markets and subjecting U.S. firms to increasing competition
from foreign firms. Globalization no doubt has the effect of reducing
the optimal scope of federal antitrust enforcement.20 5 In response,
ism offers a way to approach the state-federal relation with an eye to maximizing efficiency and
thus to achieving the substantive goal of antitrust.").
W4 Antitrust policy in the European Economic Union ("EU") appears to follow the geo-
graphic market power test fairly closely. That is, authority over purely local restraints is left to
the host country. Article 81 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which is the
EU equivalent of the U.S. Constitution, prohibits restraints of trade "which may affect trade be-
tween Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or dis-
tortion of competition within the common market." Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity, art. 81, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 208 (1997).
205 It is notable that Canada, whose merger guidelines are structurally similar to those in the
United States, has much higher thresholds for merger approval. See COMPETITION BUREAU OF
CAN., MERGER ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES (2004), available at http://cb-bc.gc.ca/epic/
internet/incb-bc.nsf/en/ct02934e.html. This is because a small open economy, such as Can-
ada's, needs higher concentration ratios in order to achieve the economies of scale that reflect
efficient production for its economy. Similarly, small states may wish to allow higher internal
concentration than federal law would allow. A smaller state may wish to tolerate an unregulated
oligopoly for other economic and political reasons. On the other hand, a larger state, such as
California, may decide to impose harsher standards than its federal counterparts. Some states
Nov. 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
rent seeking federal regulators inclined toward regulatory excess are
likely to direct increasing attention to local markets for "non-traded
goods" such as medical care, which, by definition, are largely insu-
lated from the competitive effects of globalization.20 6 The geographic
market power test constrains any such excess in the face of what is a
natural decline in the optimal scope of federal antitrust enforcement,
and where state regulators are capable of addressing the local exer-
cise of market power.
Note that under the current system a state can preclude federal
antitrust regulators from attacking both the internal and external ac-
tivities of firms doing business within the state by integrating into the
activity in question. Under the state action doctrine established in
207Parker v. Brown and upheld in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver-
tising, Inc., states are free from federal antitrust prohibitions as long
as they refrain from acting in an overtly commercial capacity. To the
extent the current system allows federal regulators inefficiently to ex-
pand their lawmaking power over otherwise private business activity
that is purely internal to the states, as a second-best solution we would
expect states to integrate into those activities at the margin to protect
themselves from federal antitrust authority.29 The adoption of the
geographic market power test would therefore lead states to divest
themselves of activities better performed by local private firms under
the state's choice of antitrust rules.
In his Summit dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out that McLean left
the lower federal court decisions in disarray over the issue of
Sherman Act jurisdiction and that the Summit majority missed an op-
portunity to clear up the resulting confusion when it found in favor
of federal jurisdiction.1 0 Since then, the lower courts have continued
in disarray, with an unduly large number of suits aimed at purely lo-
may wish to have no antitrust law whatsoever. Currently, a private plaintiff, or for that matter
the federal government, may go to court to prevent local hospitals from merging. At a time
when states may want to encourage consolidation to achieve economies of scale or better nego-
tiate Medicare payments, the state may rationally wish to allow such mergers to proceed.
M The goods and services produced in purely local markets are best seen in the context of
international trade as "non-traded goods." Increased competition in global markets should
have less of an effect on the price and output of nontraded goods than on the price and output
of traded goods.
207 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
208 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
W9 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court over-
turned National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), after only nine years. The Court in
National League of Cities found that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to en-
force federal regulations that would interfere with the states' "traditional governmental func-
tions." Id. at 852. The Court's opinion in Garcia suggests that state governments may have been
strategically gaming this protection by integrating into a host of normally private activities. Gar-
cia, 469 U.S. at 537-47.
210 Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 336 (1991).
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cal activities, many of which are arguably frivolous on either jurisdic-
tional or substantive grounds. In a large number of these cases,
plaintiffs succeed at the jurisdictional stage only to fail on the merits
as a result of their inability to prove a substantive restraint of trade
among the several states.
In BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Passavant Memorial Area Hospital
Ass'n,1 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal of a Sherman Act claim brought by a physician
against a local hospital. Whereas the district court dismissed the case
on jurisdictional grounds, the Seventh Circuit granted summary
judgment on the merits, noting the large number of Sherman Act
cases in which physicians sue hospitals in federal court for revoking
their staff privileges only to suffer dismissal on the merits. A similar
21 36 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1994).
212 Id. at 667. The court provided many examples. See, e.g., Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793
(2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court's dismissal of antitrust action by anesthesiologist
challenging exclusive contract that excluded him from working at hospital); Flegel v. Christian
Hosp., N.E.-N.W., 4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of antitrust action against
hospital by osteopaths denied privileges because they lacked certification from a particular or-
ganization); Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537 (2d
Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment for defendants in an antitrust action by radiologists
challenging exclusive contract by hospital in Albany and upstate New York that excluded the
radiologists); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judg-
ment for defendant in an antitrust action by a physician whose surgical privileges were sus-
pended); Tarabishi v. McAlester Reg'l Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1991) (granting judg-
ment for defendants in an antitrust action against hospital by physician whose privileges were
reduced after he opened up a treatment center); Oksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696
(4th Cir. 1991) (granting judgment for defendant hospital in an antitrust action brought by a
physician who was suspended, put on probation and then terminated); Bhan v. NME Hosps.,
929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary judgment for defendant in an antitrust ac-
tion by nurse anesthetist who was excluded by policy of allowing only physicians to perform an-
esthesia services); Morgan, Strand, Wheeler & Biggs v. Radiology, Ltd., 924 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir.
1991) (affirming summary judgment for defendant in an action by radiologists challenging ex-
clusive contract); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438 (1lth Cir. 1991) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant in an antitrust action by physician who was denied radiology
privileges); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming denial
of summary judgment in an action by midwives and obstetrician alleging they were prevented
from operating a maternity practice or offering midwifery services at hospitals); Beard v. Park-
view Hosp., 912 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of action by radiologist challeng-
ing exclusive contract); Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 800 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1986)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant in action by anesthesiologist whose staff privileges
were terminated); Goss v. Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 789 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming summary
judgment for defendants in action by physician whose privileges were terminated); Konik v.
Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Med. Ctr., 733 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming dismissal
of action by anesthesiologist challenging contract); Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini
Med. Ctr., 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1982) (vacating preliminary injunction which was decided in
favor of anesthesiologist challenging exclusive contract); Cogan v. Harford Mem'l Hosp., 843 F.
Supp. 1013 (D. Md. 1994) (granting summaryjudgment to defendant in action against hospital
whose policy excluded unaccredited radiology centers); Willman v. Heartland Hosp. E., 836 F.
Supp. 1522 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (granting summary judgment for defendant hospitals in action by
physician excluded after peer review); Scara v. Bradley Mem'l Hosp., No. CIV-1-91-28, 1993 WL
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case is Brader v. Allegheny General Hospital,211 in which the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court that had dismissed the
physician's Sherman Act claim on jurisdictional grounds. The Third
Circuit ruled that it was sufficient for the plaintiff simply to allege,
without any evidentiary burden, that the defendant's activities were in
or substantially affected interstate commerce. On remand, the dis-
trict court granted the defendant's motion for summaryudgment on
the merits, and the Third Circuit affirmed on appeal. '  The entire
adjudication took an additional four years, and no doubt consumed
considerable private and public resources. Under the geographic
market power test, courts would likely dismiss these cases at the outset
on jurisdictional grounds, or litigants would never file them in the
first place.
Consider Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Col-
lege,215 where a group of fraternities sued a private college that re-
quired all students to live in college housing and participate in the
college meal plan. The district court dismissed the case on jurisdic-
tional grounds.216 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that the college's activities had the connection to interstate
commerce necessary to support jurisdiction because many of its stu-• 217
dents were nonresidents. On remand, the district court dismissed
the case on the merits because the college lacked market power in
housing.218 Here, as in Brader, the final decision took four years from
the initial dismissal on jurisdictional grounds but was finally decided
on the basis of facts that could well have been used to defeat jurisdic-
tion under the geographic market power test.
2
1
9
404150 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 1993) (granting summary judgment for defendants in action by an-
esthesiologist challenging exclusive contract); Miller v. Ind. Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Pa.
1992), affd, 975 F.2d 1550 (3d Cir. 1992) (dismissing action by physician whose privileges were
terminated); Jackson v. Radcliffe, 795 F. Supp. 197 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (granting summary judg-
ment for defendants on antitrust claim in action brought against hospitals that had terminated
radiologist's contract).
213 64 F.3d 869 (3d Cir. 1995).
214 Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 832, 843 (3d Cir. 1999).
215 128 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1997).
2 Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., Civ. A. No. 95-CV-0926, 1996
WL 172652, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1996).
217 Hamilton ColL, 128 F.3d at 67.
218 Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 106 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413-14
(N.D.N.Y. 2000).
219 Cf Patel v. Scot. Mem'l Hosp., No. 95-2704, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16421, at *15-17 (4th
Cir. July 10, 1996) (affirming dismissal on the merits and not on jurisdiction); Tropical Air Fly-
ing Servs., Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 158 F. Supp. 2d 177, 188-89 (D.P.R. 2001) (dismissing
antitrust action on merits but not on jurisdiction); Lifeline Ltd. No. 11 v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 821 F. Supp. 1201, 1210 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (dismissing antitrust action based on merits but
not on jurisdiction); Brown v. Our Lady of Lourdes Med. Ctr., 767 F. Supp. 618, 632 (D.NJ.
1991) (dismissing on the merits but not on jurisdiction). But see Tice v. Hoff, No. 92-15786,
1994 WL 315654, at *1-2 (9th Cir. June 28, 1994) (affirming dismissal of claim on jurisdictional
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In many Sherman Act cases following Summit, defendants have
declined even to raise the issue of jurisdiction. Knowing the court
will simply assume jurisdiction is satisfied,22° they proceed to a trial on
the merits. In County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Community Hospital,221 for
example, a family practice physician sued a local hospital, claiming
the hospital's policy of granting the privilege to perform caesarian
sections only to certified obstetricians or physicians passing rigorous
special training violated the Sherman Act. The district court granted
the hospital's motion for summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. Nowhere in the decision is the issue of
jurisdiction discussed, let alone adjudicated. T 222
In Wagner v. Magellan Health Services, Inc., a psychiatrist sued a
managed care organization claiming it had blacklisted him in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff alleged that the relevant geo-
graphic market was the town of Barrington, apparently in an effort to
make the defendant's measured market share and likely market
power appear large. The defendant in this case did not even bother
to move for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Yet, the district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. According
to the court, the plaintiffs case failed on the merits because the
plaintiff did not allege that his loss resulted from actions that reduced
223output or raised prices for consumers.
Other courts have dismissed Sherman Act cases on the merits
without addressing jurisdiction.224 The lesson from these cases is that
defendants with legitimate jurisdictional claims would rather litigate
on the merits outright than press their jurisdictional claims and face
the uncertainty and expense of an appeal on jurisdictional grounds.220
grounds because appellant failed to allege a connection to interstate commerce except for a
conclusory allegation).
220 The Court ostensibly foreclosed the assumption of jurisdiction in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, where Justice Scalia rejected the approach of several courts of appeals in as-
suming jurisdiction where the merits question is more readily resolved, and the prevailing party
on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party ifjurisdiction were denied. Scalia held
that this approach "carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus
offends fundamental principles of separation of powers." 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
221 236 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2001).
222 121 F. Supp. 2d 673 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
223 Id. at 681.
224 See, e.g., Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming sum-
mary judgment with no discussion of jurisdiction); Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72
F.3d 1538 (lth Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal on merits of antitrust action by physician against
Orlando area hospital and other defendants including the hospital's parent corporation).
225 See, e.g., Mid-Mich. Radiology Assocs., P.C. v. Cent. Mich. Cmty. Hosp., No. 94-CV-10057-
BC, 1995 WL 239360, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 1995) (dismissing an antitrust case where de-
fendants argued for dismissal on the merits rather than on jurisdictional grounds because of
the jurisdictional issue's unsettled nature).
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These and many other cases suggest that Sherman Act defendants
are being deprived of jurisdictional protections with little corre-
sponding benefit other than the opportunity for plaintiffs to extract
concessions by engaging in costly discovery and then proceeding to a
full trial on the merits. In the physician termination cases, it is easy to
imagine that hospitals have a legitimate stake in the conduct of their
staff physicians but very difficult to imagine how a uniform national
rule on the subject promotes consumer welfare in any way. With
even a remote threat of treble damages, many defendants no doubt
settle what should be considered frivolous federal claims. By estab-
lishing a clear and substantively reasoned basis for Sherman Act ju-
risdiction, the geographic market power test would prevent waste of
judicial resources and restore defendants' jurisdictional protections.
It holds out the prospect that the proper treatment of novel business
practices can be more quickly and reliably discerned by allowing
states to innovate their own rules where the resulting effects are
completely internal to the state.
A virtual scientific revolution in economics over the past forty
years has shown that competition leads private parties to choose the
form of organization that internalizes, as far as possible, what would"1 226
otherwise be economic market spillovers. By allowing political
competition between states to resolve any remaining internal spill-
overs according to local circumstances, the geographic market power
test promises to hasten the rate at which substantive antitrust law
evolves toward the optimal treatment of novel business practices al-
leged to restrain trade. The weight of federal antitrust case law and
commentary makes it abundantly clear that considerable disagree-
ment exists about the nature or effect of novel business practices.
Federal courts have often failed to correctly assess many such prac-
tices, with a decidedly negative effect on consumer welfare during the
interim. Examples include the Court's recent reversal of the per se
227rule against vertically imposed maximum prices, its earlier reversal
228of the per se rule against vertically imposed exclusive territories, and
the advent of the characterization question to parse horizontal re-
straints that are unreasonable per se from those subject to a full rea-
sonableness inquiry. 29 Even now, federal courts are struggling with
2 This revolution probably started in earnest with Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3J.. & ECON. 1 (1960).
State Oil. Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997).
28 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
29 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979). The Court's ten-
dency prematurely to condemn novel business practices under the per se rule is puzzling given
the recognized judicial norm that the per se rule should apply only after the Court has had suffi-
cient experience with the practice at hand to make an informed judgment regarding the prob-
able effect on consumer welfare. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
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the proper application of the Sherman Act to horizontal aggregations
in so-called "network industries," for which the optimal tradeoff be-
tween allocative and productive efficiency is far from clear.23° This is
not to criticize our federal courts out of hand; it is simply to say that
they have failed to preserve a federal system in which competitive
state lawmaking could be mobilized to provide a more rapid informa-
tion feedback mechanism as to the effect on consumer welfare of
novel business practices.
The question antitrust regulators face in reviewing horizontal ar-
rangements under the consumer welfare standard is whether the as-
sociated productive efficiencies, if any, are likely to offset the alloca-
tive inefficiency from the creation of market power. Because
horizontal mergers are likely to enhance productive efficiency by in-
tegrating productive activity, their net effect after accounting for allo-
cative inefficiency may be to increase consumer welfare, and federal
courts therefore address them under the rule of reason.!3' Horizontal
arrangements that involve no apparent integration of productive ac-
tivity are considered unlikely to generate productive efficiency, but,
following the Court's recognition of proper characterization, this
presumption has changed.
Commentators now recognize that, even though horizontal re-
straints may generate market power, they may also generate offsetting
productive efficiencies. Unadulterated naked price fixing between
rival firms with large market share is unlikely to generate productive
efficiencies, but, ever since the Court's decision in United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co.,2 2 business combinations seldom come so neatly
packaged. Many horizontal business arrangements designed to avert
moral hazard, agency, or other incentive problems may appear at first
348 (1982) (holding that maximum fee agreement between two medical societies is per se unlaw-
ful under the Sherman Act despite the societies' argument that the agreement lowers health
care costs).
230 Cf United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming in
part and remanding in part an antitrust decision against the operating system manufacturer).
For an important scholarly work on network effects see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,
The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990) (discussing the theory that an inferior standard
may succeed over a challenger because users will not adopt the challenger out of fear that it will
not succeed, and examining evidence that the QWERTY keyboard is not clearly inferior to the
unsuccessful Dvorak keyboard and thus does not strongly support the theory).
231 One proxy for productive efficiency for an industry composed of publicly traded corpora-
tions is the effect of the proposed merger on nonmerging firms' stock prices. If these firms'
stock prices decline in response to an unanticipated merger announcement, the inference-
assuming that the antitrust agencies properly decline to challenge the merger-is that the pro-
posed merger will reduce the merged firm's production costs and make it a more aggressive
competitor. If these firms' stock prices increase, on the other hand, the inference is that they
will be the fortunate beneficiaries of market power created by the merging firms.
232 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (holding that an agreement to fix uniform prices by companies con-
trolling eighty percent of the market violates the Sherman Act).
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glance to have the sole effect of generating market power for the par-
ticipating firms, while on closer examination they are found to gen-
erate offsetting productive efficiencies. Examples include syndicates
formed by investment banks to market initial public offerings of cor-
porate stock,2 3 vertically imposed resale price maintenance, verti-
cally imposed exclusive territories between horizontally situated re-
tailers,2 ' and copyright licensing arrangements.
Although courts have yet to formally adopt a full reasonableness
inquiry for horizontal restraints, they have done so where nonprice
restraints are vertically imposed. But even for purely horizontal re-
straints, including price restraints, where the participating firms'
combined market share is small and increasing over time, a compel-
ling case can be made that, absent the use of exclusionary practices,
the arrangement generates productive efficiencies that outweigh any
allocative inefficiency from the creation of market power. Otherwise,
the participating firms' combined market shares would decline over
217time as rivals expand production and undercut their prices. By
promoting inter-jurisdictional competition over optimal antitrust pol-
icy, the geographic market power test fosters experimentation and
innovation and will more quickly resolve any uncertainties regarding
the proper treatment of novel business practices.
One need not look very far to find evidence that state competition
over antitrust policy will improve the judicial treatment of novel busi-
ness practices. Recall the Mandeville Island Farms case, for example,
where the defendant and its alleged co-conspirators sold their sugar
into a national market in which their market share was so small they
could not possibly have influenced sugar prices. As beet buyers, they
may have enjoyed market power in northern California that allowed
them to impose a monopsony underpayment on beet growers. But
together with substantial evidence that sugar refining is subject to
various incentive problems-including the difficulty of measuring
sugar beet quality and the attendant moral hazard-the plaintiff's
willingness to enter into the challenged contract ex ante raises at
least a modicum of doubt that the contract constituted a naked re-
233 Cf United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (holding that such a
syndicate is not illegal under the Sherman Act).
234 Cf Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960)
(explaining why some manufacturers prefer their products to be sold by retailers at a minimum
retail price).
Cf Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (holding that such ar-
rangements should be judged under the rule of reason, rather than the perse rule).
26 Cf Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 25 (1979) (remanding a
challenge to such an arrangement under the Sherman Act to a district court for review under
the rule of reason).
237 The Court applied this reasoning in overturning the per se rule against vertical division of
territories in Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 56.
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straint. More than likely, the agreement there was designed to
avoid a moral hazard that otherwise would have increased transaction
costs. Given that the market for sugar beets was entirely local, with
no possibility that a monopsony underpayment could spill across state
lines, Mandeville Island Farms stands as a poster child for the geo-
graphic market power test. By allowing the states to "perform their
role as laboratories for experimentation.., where the best solution is
far from clear, ' '23 9 the geographic market power test ensures that the
entire body of antitrust law, both state and federal, will iterate more
quickly toward the optimal set of legal rules.
V. UNCERTAINTY, EVOLUTION, AND GENERAL
COMMERCE CLAUSEJURISDICTION
The environment selects survivors .... 2 4
The Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison suggest a majority of
the Justices would like to establish a clear and substantively reasoned
basis for limiting federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction in a way that
is consistent with competitive federalism. In part, this appears to re-
flect the Court's discomfort over its inability to establish bounds for
the substantial effects test. As Justice Thomas stated in his Lopez con-
currence, "[i] n an appropriate case, I believe that we must further re-
consider our 'substantial effects' test with an eye toward constructing
a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause
without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence., 241 The question is how. The Court can begin by overturning
Summit and adopting the geographic market power test as the basis
for Sherman Act jurisdiction. This would set the bounds of the sub-
stantial effects test in the antitrust context by requiring the party as-
serting jurisdiction to allege a substantial interstate spillover of mar-
ket power.
29 See generally Jeanine Koenig Balbach, The Effect of Ownership on Contract Structure, Costs, and
Quality: The Case of the U.S. Beet Sugar Industry, in THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE:
VERTICAL COORDINATION IN THE U.S. FOOD SYSTEM (Jeffrey S. Royer & Richard T. Rogers eds.,
1998). Among other things, she reports that the American Crystal Sugar Company was ulti-
mately bought by a cooperative of growers. This vertical integration by a horizontal combina-
tion of growers was apparendy designed to reduce the transaction costs involved in measuring
the quality of sugar beets.
239 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
240 Johnsen, supra note 21, at 154. This statement follows from Armen A. Alchian, Uncer-
tainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58J. POL. ECON. 211, 220-21 (1950) (arguing that biologi-
cal theories of natural selection may be applied by economists to predict complex business be-
haviors).
241 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas,J., concurring).
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In what follows, we sketch a model that shows how a common law
judicial system evolves to reduce legal uncertainty in the face of posi-
tive administrative costs. We then show that the geographic market
power test represents a compelling step in the evolution of Sherman
Act jurisdiction that promises to dramatically reduce legal uncer-
tainty. By adopting the geographic market power test for Sherman
Act jurisdiction, the Court can redirect the evolution of general
Commerce Clause jurisdiction while posing little immediate threat to
the existing stock of constitutional precedents.
Regulatory statutes inject sudden uncertainty into a common law
judicial system based on stare decisis, which is ideally suited to incre-
mental adjustments in response to changing circumstances. Absent
established precedent or clear understanding of the statute's objec-
tive, a common law system begins a slow iterative process of case-by-
case adjudication to resolve the uncertainty.2 4 The accumulated case
law-including those cases establishing rules that were subsequently
overturned or distinguished-eventually comes to embody a stock of
knowledge that allows judges to economize on the costs of adminis-
tering new cases as they arise. This process gradually adapts the form
of legal rules to changed circumstances, filling out the interstices of
the common law and reducing legal uncertainty.
The influence of legal uncertainty and costly administration on
the expressed form of legal rules is evident from the evolution of
Sherman Act case law. 43 We have already briefly recounted the evo-144
lution of the consumer welfare standard. A similar evolutionary
process has been at work regarding the Court's use of the rule of rea-
242 Uncertainty generates disagreement between potential litigants about the likely outcome
of the dispute and raises the number of disputes that are litigated to judgment. For early work
on the role of uncertainty in common law adjudication, see William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 259-84 (1979) (noting that the ex-
isting literature has generally overstated the tendency of a common law system to produce effi-
cient rules); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. LEGAL
STUD. 65, 65-75 (1977) (arguing that common law decision making facilitates the efficient allo-
cation of resources); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (suggesting a model in which the determinants of settlement and
litigation are solely economic factors); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977) (theorizing that the common law system is efficient due to utility
maximizing decisions of disputants and not because of wise judicial decisions).
243 From the outset, some members of Congress sought to keep legal uncertainty to a mini-
mum by declaring that the Act was designed merely to apply the existing common law of trade
restraints to those occurring among the several states (and to increase the associated penalties).
See BORK, supra note 22, at 20 (noting that Sherman assured the Senate that his Act would
merely "enact the common law").
244 For an interesting view of this evolution, see Mark Grady, Toward a Positive Economic Theory
of Antitrust, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 225, 237 (1992) (describing various theories about the way com-
mon law changes over time, including the legal realist theory, economic theory, and Oliver
Wendell Holmes's theory involving precedent and social values).
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son to address specific trade restraints. 2 45  Early on, the Court estab-
lished the per se rule to preclude a costly reasonableness inquiry into
restraints such as price fixing that are so unlikely to benefit consum-
ers that they can be presumed unreasonable as a matter of law even
246though there might be rare cases in which they benefit consumers.
The Court addresses the per se category of restraints in a perfunctory
manner to devote its scarce judicial resources to resolving disputes in
the presumptively reasonable category, for which the net effect on
consumer welfare is a question of fact. 47 The underlying objective of
the Sherman Act must therefore be some combination of consumer
welfare and judicial economy, rather than consumer welfare alone,
because unconditional pursuit of the consumer welfare standard
245 The Court adopted the rule of reason as a basis for assessing Sherman Act claims in Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911). It eventually concluded that this rule would
not allow it to entertain a defense to price fixing premised on the reasonableness of the defen-
dants' prices. In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395-402 (1927), the Court
therefore adopted a per se rule against price fixing, according to which, uncontroverted evi-
dence of the existence of a horizontal price agreement raises an irrebuttable presumption that
the restraint is unreasonable. The Court retreated slightly from the per se rule in Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), by applying the rule of reason to a central agency
for the sale of defendants' coal established in response to distressed industrial conditions dur-
ing the Great Depression. Seeing that this led to a proliferation of horizontal arrangements
ostensibly designed to "stabilize" prices, however, it quickly reversed itself in United States v. So-
cony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). There, it not only cemented the per se rule, but
expanded it to apply to any concerted conduct between defendants with the intent to do any-
thing that might affect prices in any way. For a more in-depth discussion of Socony-Vacuum and
the property rights explanation for buying programs, see D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to
Cartel Rents: The Socony-Vacuum Story, 34J.L. & ECON. 177 (1991). Naturally, such a broad per
se rule was sure to sweep in any number of pro-competitive business arrangements and became
increasingly suspect as the Court's experience with the case law and economic understanding of
trade restraints progressed. The inevitable result was the evolution of the "characterization"
question in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979), according
to which some horizontal pricing arrangements-in this case a centralized method of licensing
and monitoring the use of composers' copyrighted works-are not to be characterized as the
kind that are illegal per se, and instead are to be assessed under a full rule of reason inquiry.
Together with repeated declarations by the Court that it will not apply the per se rule to a cate-
gory of business activity until it has had sufficient experience addressing it under the rule of
reason, this evolution reflects an iterative process of legal decision making based on informa-
tion feedback and the accumulation of specialized knowledge.
246 Discussing per se rules, Bork stated:
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on the assumption
that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the losses and that significant
administrative advantages will result. In other words, the potential competitive harm
plus the administrative costs of determining in what particular situations the practice
may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result. If the potential benefits
in the aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they are simply not worth identify-
ing in individual cases.
BORK, supra note 22, at 18 (quoting United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341
(1969) (Marshall,J., dissenting)).
247 For a similar view of the evolution of the rule of reason, see HYLTON, supra note 162, at
104-12, 130-31 (arguing that there is a utilitarian justification behind the Court's use of the per
se rule, in that there are relatively few instances of socially beneficial price fixing).
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would require the Court to engage in a full reasonableness inquiry in
all cases. Rather than being the underlying objective, consumer wel-
fare is merely a useful proxy for the objective that actually drives the
Court's administration of the Act. 4s The important general point is
that the cost of legal administration affects the expressed form of the
legal rule-in this case the consumer welfare standard as limited by
the per se ru-e24 -causing it to depart from an unbiased pursuit of the
statute's underlying objective.
A fitting principled statement of the Sherman Act's objective, and
indeed the objective of any body of common law, is to promote the
commonwealth. 250 The commonwealth is not simply the sum of indi-
vidual wealth of the members of society. Much of that wealth is pri-
vate and beyond the judiciary's practical sphere of influence in the
garden variety of cases. The commonwealth includes the shared
value of society's public goods, such as the judicial system itself, to-
gether with its accumulated body of common law precedents. 251 As a
positive proposition, the judicial system promotes the commonwealth
by selecting in favor of legal rules that increase the expected net pre-
sent value of the investments private parties (including future genera-
tions) will make in reliance on these rules after deducting the social
costs of administering them.252 These costs consist of the direct costs
courts incur to conduct legal proceedings, as well as the indirect
costs, both of which can be seen as a type of friction or transaction
cost broadly conceived, which impedes the effortless functioning of
the legal system.
248 An appropriate restatement might be that courts should decide cases to maximize con-
sumer welfare conditional upon the costs of legal administration being held constant. But even
holding the costs ofjudicial administration constant, if consumer welfare was truly the objective
of the Sherman Act, then horizontal combinations between consumers to establish market
power in purchasing-so-called "monopsony" price fixing-as alleged in Mandeville Island
Farms, 334 U.S. 219, 221 (1948), would be embraced by antitrust regulators and courts.
249 For some purposes, scholars have found it worthwhile to distinguish between rules and
standards. We do not rely on this distinction. But see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (distinguishing rules from standards only by the
.extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before [as with rules] or after
[as with standards] individuals act").
250 Wealth is the discounted present value of future income and therefore includes the long-
run consequences of an action in the decision calculus. D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth is Value, 15J.
LEGAL STUD. 263, 268-70 (1986).
251 Some commentators may prefer the maximization of "social wealth," "social utility," or
"social welfare" to "promotion of the commonwealth." The important point is that consumer
welfare clearly is not an accurate statement of what drives judicial decisions.
252 This selection process favors legal rules that provide greater certainty, if for no other rea-
son than that uncertain legal rules will generate divergent expectations by the parties to a dis-
pute, who are then more likely to engage in litigation that eventually overturns them. See Priest
& Klein, supra note 242, at 4 (noting that the information that parties possess about the likeli-
hood of success at trial, based partly on knowledge of applicable legal precedent, is one deter-
minant of settlement and litigation).
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Indirect costs include those that private parties incur gathering
the information to conform their conduct to the legal rule and, if
they become litigants, to gather and present evidence regarding their
conformity to the legal rule. Perhaps most important for our pur-
poses, indirect costs also include the foregone opportunities the judi-
ciary incurs in administering the law in various case categories, but
also in accumulating a stock of knowledge to refine the body of legal
rules to address new circumstances and to incorporate the flexibility
to do so at low cost. Since legal rules merely serve as a proxy for the
underlying objective of the law, their application is inherently uncer-
tain, and the resulting adjudication will inevitably generate errors as
revealed by legal commentators and subsequent courts addressing
the same or similar issues. A cruder proxy might involve greater up-
front uncertainty than the alternative, and yet the errors it generates
may be more informative as to how it can be adapted to new cases,
changes in related legal rules, or outside shocks such as social up-
heaval, scientific revolutions, or advancing technology. Even if a rule
is ultimately overturned or distinguished, any systematic pattern in
the errors it generated may provide useful information about the na-
ture of the rule that should replace it. Formalistic bright-line rules
such as E.C. Knight's distinction between manufacturing and com-
merce may be relatively clear and easily administered for garden vari-
ety cases, but they can fail miserably to accomplish the law's underly-
ing objective where their application is inappropriate or uncertain.
Because they generate very few nominal errors, moreover, they may
end up providing little information about what rule should refine or
replace them. A capacity for information feedback, learning, and
flexibility constitute long-run investments that can allow the judiciary
to gradually iterate toward a clear and substantively reasoned body of
legal rules that promote the commonwealth .
It follows as a positive proposition that the federal judiciary ad-
ministers the balance of dual sovereignty under the Commerce
Clause as if it was attempting to promote the commonwealth. Since
judicial administration is costly, however, we would expect the ex-
pressed form of the legal rule to constitute a more or less crude proxy
253 See, e.g., William H. Page & Roger D. Blair, Controlling the Competitor Plaintiff in Antitrust
Litigation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 111, 113 (1992) ("[Developing antitrust law] requires the gradual
development of standards based upon the accumulated knowledge of antitrust cases and the
prevailing economic wisdom."). Our federal court system generates information feedback in
many ways. We have already noted the role state courts can play under the geographic market
power test in generating information feedback about strictly local restraints through application
of their own specific antitrust laws. This information can feed into the federal system through
cases involving diversity jurisdiction in which the federal court must apply state antitrust law,
thereby providing federal judges with a basis for accumulating knowledge about the results of
deviations from federal antitrust law.
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for the commonwealth. Compared to the unconstrained substantial
effects test, competitive federalism offers a suitably refined proxy for
the optimal balance of dual sovereignty in antitrust, where the geo-
graphic market power test now allows courts to identify the interstate
effects of trade restraint with relatively little error.
If this positive proposition is correct, then the evolution of Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction should not be inconsistent with competitive
federalism's focus on interstate economic spillovers. Indeed, Mar-
shall's central economic point in Gibbons v. Ogden was that commer-
cial activities occurring outside a state may spill over state lines in a
way that warrants federal regulation. Perhaps understandably, he
failed to articulate any practical method of distinguishing the exactn r .... . . . 254
nature of the effects giving rise to exclusive federal jurisdiction. In
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Court found that the proper regulation
of certain activities demands the discretion to meet local necessities,
while the proper regulation of other activities demands a single uni-
form rule. 2 Cooley thereby approximated the central principle of
competitive federalism, namely that some market failures are inher-
ently local in nature and best left to the local sovereign while others
are national in nature and best left to the federal government.
Perhaps Kidds formalistic reliance on the distinction between
commerce and manufacturing was a sufficient proxy for interstate
economic spillovers to protect dormant commerce powers, but the
rise of the affirmative Commerce Clause with passage of the Sherman
Act appears to have changed that. Justice Holmes's decision in Swift
& Co. v. United States, rejecting E. C. Knight's formalistic distinction be-
tween commerce and manufacturing as a basis for Sherman Act ju-
risdiction-itself an unworkably crude proxy for interstate spill-
overs--correctly recognized that the economic effect of trade
restraints can spill across state lines even though the defendants'
products remain within the state.256 Note that Holmes offered little to
replace E.C. Knight's formalistic rule except the admonition that in-
terstate commerce is a practical conception "drawn from the course
of business."57 The Shreveport Rate Cases provided limited guidance
several years later, finding that Congress has the power to regulate
the "common instrumentalities" of interstate commerce such as rail-
road cars, even if those cars remain entirely intrastate, because re-
straints on intrastate rates can spill over to interstate rates.28 Though
Cf 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) ("But, in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the
power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a
very useless power, if it could not pass those lines.").
25 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
26 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 392 (1905).
27 Id. at 398.
234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914).
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"common instrumentalities" of interstate commerce is a crude proxy
for interstate economic spillovers, the facts in that case suggest there
could easily have been such a spillover. Of course, this rule is likely to
err by condemning activities involving common instrumentalities of
interstate commerce that generate no interstate spillover and by fail-
ing to condemn activities that do not involve common instrumentali-
ties but do generate interstate spillovers. The same can be said for
the Court's occasional reliance on the "channels" of interstate com-
merce to support federal jurisdiction.259
Wickard gave us the aggregated substantial effects test, which, al-
though it is generally a very crude proxy for interstate spillovers, was
applied there in an economically plausible way.260 The Court has re-
peatedly used an unconstrained version of this test to support federal
jurisdiction over various activities, including racial discrimination.
The geographic market power test is simply a reduced form of the
unconstrained substantial effects test bounded by the requirement
that the party asserting jurisdiction must allege a specific nexus,
grounded in practical antitrust economics, between the defendant's
restraint and the interstate spillover of market power. Based on the
geographic market power test's constrained reliance on substantial
effects, we now know that the defendants' activities in Mandeville Is-
land Farms, Hospital Building, Goldfarb, and Summit probably did not
cause interstate economic spillovers of the kind the Sherman Act is
meant to address. 26' These cases reveal systematic errors from the
Court's reliance on an excessively crude and uncertain proxy-the
substantial effects test unconstrained by sound antitrust economics-
to establish federal jurisdiction, and in hindsight the Court clearly
erred by allowing the plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction. The substan-
tial effects test therefore has the virtue of being flexible and in no way
logically inconsistent with competitive federalism. Although it has
generated a lot of litigation, it has also generated a large body of trial
and appellate case law that provides useful information about the na-
ture of the errors in its application and the best way to refine it as ju-
dicial understanding evolves.
259 See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917) ("[T]he authority of Congress to
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been fre-
quently sustained, and is no longer open to question.").
260 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), has proven wildly unpopular with political conser-
vatives and others who favor limited federal powers, but this can only be because the marketing
quotas for wheat appear to have been motivated by rent seeking. Conditional on agricultural
price supports being in the national interest, which arguably requires a real stretch of the
imagination, the underlying economic theory is perfectly sound and based on Congress's spe-
cific finding that the supply of home grown wheat for on-the-farm consumption was sufficiently
elastic that it could undermine any attempt to support national wheat prices because it would
have resulted in an interstate economic spillover.
261 See supra Part I.C.
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Finally, in Lopez and Morrison the Court rejected the uncon-
strained substantial effects test and dispelled any suggestion that fed-
eral commerce power is limitless. These and other recent decisions
by the Court relied on what looks like competitive federalism as the
proper framework for resolving the balance of dual sovereignty. Per-
haps these cases signal a new direction for the Court's Commerce
Clause case law. Federal judges and the parties to Sherman Act litiga-
tion now have a clear economic methodology for identifying an inter-
state geographic antitrust market and assessing the likelihood that
the defendants' alleged restraint, if successful, could plausibly cause
prices to increase in that market. In addressing Sherman Act juris-
diction, the Court can now confidently reject the unconstrained sub-
stantial effects test in favor of the relatively clear geographic market
power test. Lower federal courts can then begin requiring the party
asserting jurisdiction to allege a specific substantive nexus between
the defendants' restraint and the interstate spillover of market power,
giving defendants a proper chance of prevailing on the threshold is-
sue ofjurisdiction.
Our earlier discussion showed that federal district courts have re-
peatedly granted antitrust defendants summary judgment on the
merits for reasons that would have warranted dismissal for failure of
subject matter jurisdiction. In light of the geographic market power
test, these substantive decisions now appear as errors on the issue of
jurisdiction. The overlap between substance and jurisdiction derives
from the Act's language, which arguably makes restraints of trade
"among the several states" both an element of the substantive offense
and the basis for federal jurisdiction. Justice Scalia's recent decision
in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment reveals the source of in-
formation feedback from substance to jurisdiction.2  In his words,
"[d]ismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the in-
adequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is 'so in-
substantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court,
or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal
controversy.',2 63 This finding establishes an admittedly narrow basis
for dismissing cases for weakness on the merits of the substantive fed-
eral claim, as where the mere existence of a trade restraint is in sub-
stantial doubt from the face of the plaintiff's claim.26 But the window
is presumably wide enough to support dismissal for failure of subject-
matter jurisdiction when the specific weakness at issue is the plain-
262 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
265 Id. at 89 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)).
2 An apt example is where the plaintiff tries to support a Sherman Act claim for price fixing
by alleging that the defendants raised their prices simultaneously with no additional allegations
that they agreed to do so.
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tiffs inability to plausibly allege that the defendants' restraint caused
prices to rise in more states than one. Because of the overlap, lower
courts' understanding of the nature of various trade restraints is likely
to improve with accumulated experience. Their understanding of
the geographic scope of trade restraints is also likely to improve, and
any revealed errors will continue to provide a mechanism for infor-
mation feedback and learning.265
A potential criticism of the geographic market power test is that it
appears to depart from the Court's repeated findings that the scope
of Sherman Act jurisdiction is concurrent with the scope of federal
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.166 This criticism misses the mark for
at least two reasons. First, the outer limits of Commerce Clause juris-
prudence have been shaped by situations in which "Congress itself
has defined the specific persons and activities that affect commerce
and therefore require federal regulation., 267 As in Wickard, Congress
made specific findings identifying the parties subject to the agricul-
tural marketing quotas and noting the substantiality of the aggregate
effect of homegrown wheat on national wheat prices. But as Justice
Scalia quoted in Summit, " It] he jurisdictional inquiry under general
prohibitions like ... § 1 of the Sherman Act, turn [s] ... on the cir-
cumstances presented in each case and requir[es] a particularized
judicial determination .... ,268 In applying the Sherman Act, courts
are in no position to gather facts or make specific findings regarding
parties outside the proceeding, and horizontal aggregation under the
substantial effects test is appropriately limited in such cases. 2 6 9
The second reason why the above criticism misses the mark is that
the finding on which it relies is dictum. The general limits of Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction cannot be defined in a vacuum because the
265 Identifying the proper market power threshold for various restraints may take time. For
example, where the lower federal courts might initially feel comfortable denying jurisdiction
where the defendants are alleged to have engaged in horizontal division of territories and have
an HHI of less than 1000 in the relevant interstate geographic antitrust market, after sufficient
experience on the merits with such cases courts might raise the HHI threshold to 1600.
266 See, e.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) ("Congress,
in passing the Sherman Act, left no area of its constitutional power unoccupied; it 'exercised all
the power it possessed.'" (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940))); see
also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328-29 (1991) (discussing how the Commerce
Clause and Sherman Act have "experienced similar expansion").
267 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 n.12 (1974).
2 Summit, 500 U.S. at 334 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp., 419 U.S. at 197 n.12).
269 Mandeville Island Farms stands as a stark example of the misuse of the aggregation princi-
ple. There, the Court hypothesized that national sugar prices would be substantially affected if
other beet refiners across the county, which were not parties to the litigation, engaged in the
same practice as the defendant. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 236 (1948). The hypothesis is not only ultra vires, it is very likely wrong in the context
of horizontal price agreements, where the most commonly observed pattern is for outside firms
to undercut those engaged in a restraint.
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measure of those limits depends on the statute in question, the form
of the economic spillover it addresses, and judicial uncertainty re-
garding the nature and scope of the spillover. Even in the absence of
uncertainty, specific activity that generates interstate economic spill-
overs in one setting may not do so in another; restraints of trade are a
different animal than, say, racial discrimination, and the proper
means of addressing them differ accordingly. What is more, uncer-
tainty over the nature and scope of economic spillovers dictates that
the Court rely on different proxies to identify the relevant spillovers
in different settings. The level of uncertainty regarding trade re-
straints is now low enough that reliance on the geographic market
power test's constrained substantial effects test is perfectly justified,
even though the Court relies on a relatively unconstrained version of
the substantial effects test in the area of civil rights.
Although the unconstrained substantial effects test appears vague
and overly expansive, when applied to the issue of Sherman Act juris-
diction it has allowed for information feedback and provides the
flexibility to adapt to advances in judicial understanding about the
nature and geographic scope of the underlying market failure. The
general point is that the judicial system is capable of gradually over-
coming the uncertainty regulatory statutes create and allowing the
Court to identify increasingly constrained versions of the substantial
effects test. As with the Sherman Act, the substantive and jurisdic-
tional inquiries in any Commerce Clause regulation overlap to some
extent and are necessarily economic in nature. Over time, advances
in economic understanding will identify the substantive nexus, if one
in fact exists,2 7° between the activity addressed by any regulatory stat-
ute and an interstate economic spillover. It is the identification of
the substantive nexus that promises to bound the substantial effects
test in any given setting and allow the Court to move toward a bal-
ance of dual sovereignty consistent with the framework of competitive
federalism.
In our view, competitive federalism provides the ideal framework
to guide the evolution of Commerce Clause case law, but as with con-
sumer welfare it is simply a useful proxy for promoting the common-
wealth. The consumer welfare standard has certainly proven to be a
powerful expression of the Sherman Act's underlying objective; it has
dramatically reduced legal uncertainty regarding a wide range of
trade restraints, to say nothing of its role in guiding the economic
methodology behind the geographic market power test. Competitive
federalism is an equally powerful expression of the objective underly-
ing the Commerce Clause. Butjust as the per se rule limits the Court's
270 It will ultimately be revealed if no such nexus exists and the statute must be overturned as
beyond federal commerce power.
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application of the consumer welfare standard to economize on the
costs of judicial administration, some version of the substantial effects
test would most likely limit the Court's application of competitive
federalism. No proxy can be expected to perfectly identify its target.
In applying the Sherman Act, proxies for interstate market fail-
ures such as "channels" or "instrumentalities" of commerce are no
longer helpful in assisting the trier of fact to determine whether an
interstate spillover is more likely than not. They are simply too crude
to be informative compared to the geographic market power test.
These proxies may nevertheless be useful expressions of the jurisdic-
tional limits of other federal regulatory statutes, but only because ju-
dicial uncertainty is so great that the Court must rely on them out of
practical necessity. Together with the unconstrained version of the
substantial effects test, they will no doubt generate informative errors
regarding the scope of economic spillovers. At the same time, litiga-
tion on the merits of a statute will generate informative errors regard-
ing the exact nature of the underlying market failure. As the case law
on substance and jurisdiction evolves they should gradually converge,
allowing the Court to identify the specific substantive nexus between
the defendants' conduct and the relevant interstate spillover.
In the context of Commerce Clause regulation, many statutes are
necessarily vague about the nature and scope of the underlying eco-
nomic spillover, but it is plausible that they promote more or less
compelling objectives, as with civil rights legislation. In the face of
legal uncertainty and costly judicial administration, the Court simply
must provide some measure of deference to federal statutes in assess-
ing whether they fall within Congress's commerce powers. This con-
clusion follows reasonably from the nature of the respective sovereign
powers. In the face of legal uncertainty, when the national govern-
ment's enumerated powers appear to conflict with state governments'
residual powers, the residual powers should yield because they pro-
vide the states with countless alternative courses of action. Indeed,
this may explain the deference the Supremacy and Necessary and
Proper Clauses seem to compel from the Court in applying various
constitutional provisions. What is more, we would expect to find that
deference being wider where legal uncertainty is greater. The un-
constrained substantial effects test is merely a reflection of this defer-
ence born of practical necessity. It would be a grave mistake for the
Court to reject the general principle that the activity a regulatory
statute proscribes must bear a specific substantive nexus to an inter-
state economic spillover where the Court has yet to discern the exact
contours of that nexus because it is unable to accurately measure the
prohibited effects. For the ideal case in which the Court's economic
understanding of the nature and geographic extent of the market
failure is clear, as under the Sherman Act, federal jurisdiction prop-
erly requires the party asserting it to allege a substantive nexus be-
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tween the defendant's conduct and the interstate spillover to which
the regulation is directed. Short of the ideal case, however, the Court
must invariably rely on more or less crude proxies for interstate spill-
overs in parsing the contours of federal jurisdiction. In this setting,
the plaintiff should at least have the. burden of demonstrating, on the
merits, the existence of a substantive nexus between the defendant's
conduct and the accepted proxy for interstate spillovers. Over time,
the federal judiciary's experience with the substantive issues under
various federal statutes should allow it to accumulate a stock of
knowledge regarding the nature and scope of the underlying market
failures,2 to refine its proxies over time, and to gradually iterate to-
ward the balance of dual sovereignty consistent with competitive fed-
eralism.
Under this approach, the charge to Congress in passing federal
regulation should be to identify what it believes to be an economic
market failure common to more states than one and to make a plau-
sible case that the states, acting independently, face a political market
failure precluding them from correcting the problem. This would
provide the Court with a substantive basis for assessing whether the
regulation falls within Congress's constitutional authority. The Court
could then review the regulation under the rational basis or strict
scrutiny standards, giving due deference to Congress to account for
legal uncertainty and its own administrative costs, and uphold it,
strike it down, or enforce it to the extent necessary to achieve legiti-
mate congressional ends. Of course, Congress is unlikely to be able
to identify the exact economic nature of the market failure in any
given situation, just as it was unable to do so when it passed the
Sherman Act. But competitive federalism provides a sufficiently
broad framework so that the Court could nevertheless make an initial
assessment that political competition between states is unlikely to re-
solve the problem as Congress has identified it, and then articulate
the proper limits of Congress's regulatory response as it gains addi-
tional experience with the subject, quite possibly guided by concur-
rent advances in economic understanding. Of course the Court may
err, but the important point is that it should take care to follow the
general framework of competitive federalism so that over time the er-
rors are self-correcting and the judicial process can select in favor of
rules that promote the commonwealth.
We have already noted that some are skeptical that the framework
of competitive federalism can be used to effectively limit federal
271 As under the Sherman Act, civil causes of action for violating federal statutes no doubt
hasten the process of knowledge accumulation.
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commerce powers. It is absolutely correct that those engaged in
rent seeking are normally clever enough to make a plausible case that
the regulation they seek is designed to address an interstate eco-
nomic spillover. This criticism would be crippling if the common law
were static, but both our model of judicial uncertainty and the
Court's recent decisions suggest that the federal judiciary is capable
of learning and evolving to reduce legal errors over time. The re-
sponse might be that this process is not fast enough, but the question
then becomes "compared to what?" Apparently, the next best alter-
native with respect to a provision as vague as the Commerce Clause is
to admonish judges to strictly construe the constitution, or return to
original intent, to stop legislating, or simply to do nothing, none of
which holds out much hope for progress. Political rent seeking no
doubt occurs, but this is largely a red herring in our analysis because
it occurs at both the federal and state levels. Those whose rent seek-
ing is aimed at purely local markets, say, barbers seeking occupational
licensing, 3 should have little reason to push for federal regulation.
Instead, they will confine their lobbying efforts to their local or state
governments. They will organize themselves nationally and push for
federal regulation only if state regulation would result in interstate
economic spillovers that undermine their ability to capture rents.
Given that it can be quite difficult to distinguish public interest regu-
lation from regulation motivated by rent seeking, a balance of dual
sovereignty based on interstate economic spillovers pushes rent seek-
ing activity into the proper political forum. It is then reasonable to
rely on the political process to limit rent seeking and to focus on
maintaining effective competition between the state and federal gov-
ernments.
The evolutionary approach we outline in this Article is by no
means perfect. It will require the Court to firmly imbed competitive
federalism in its case law as a long-run evolutionary framework for
redirecting Commerce Clause jurisdiction. We believe the Court's
adoption of the geographic market power test for Sherman Act juris-
diction would be a powerful force in this regard. Its inevitable suc-
cess in resolving the limits of Sherman Act jurisdiction would dra-
matically reduce legal uncertainty in applying competitive federalism
to other regulatory statutes. It would also spark a sustained increase
in scholarly attention to the nature and scope of market failures be-
hind a host of federal statutes by those otherwise accustomed to
272 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 14, at 1047 ("[I]t is difficult in practice to realize all the benefits
of federalism.").
273 See GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 13-17
(1971) (using occupational licensing as an example of the use of the political process at the
state level "to improve the economic circumstances of a group).
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thinking such projects are fruitless because federal commerce power
has no limits.
